Aufsätze in Wettbewerbsökonomik by Hunold, Matthias
Aufsätze in Wettbewerbsökonomik
(Essays in Competition Economics)
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen
Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
Matthias Hunold, vorgelegt im
Frühjahrs-Sommer-Semester 2013
Abteilungssprecher: Professor Dr. Martin Peitz
Referent: Professor em. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D.
Korreferent: Professor Yossi Spiegel, Ph.D.
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 17. Juni 2013
3Anerkennung und Danksagung. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen zu drei
wettbewerbsökonomischen Themen. Ich bedanke mich bei den Koautoren der ersten bei-
den Aufsätze für die gute Zusammenarbeit. Ferner bedanke ich mich für die Unterstützung
bei Kollegen und Professoren, insbesondere für die Beratung durch Yossi Spiegel und Kon-
rad Stahl.
Acknowledgments and Gratitude. This dissertation consists of three essays on three
topics in competition economics. I thank the co-authors of the first two essays for the good
cooperation. Moreover, I thank colleagues and professors for the support, in particular
Yossi Spiegel and Konrad Stahl for the advice.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
General Introduction 6
Kapitel 1. Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail
services 9
1.1. Introduction 10
1.2. Model 13
1.3. Analysis 15
1.3.1. Equilibrium without resale price maintenance 15
1.3.2. Equilibrium with resale price maintenance 17
1.3.3. Competitive effects of resale price maintenance 17
1.3.4. Investments in the service level 19
1.3.5. Asymmetric market power and resale price maintenance 21
1.3.6. Direct inter-brand price competition 22
1.4. Conclusion 23
Appendix A: Proofs 25
Appendix B: Parametric example 29
Kapitel 2. Strategic backward integration 30
2.1. Introduction 31
2.2. Model 34
2.3. Stage 3: Supplier choice and the determination of downstream prices 35
2.4. Stage 2: Determination of upstream prices under passive ownership 36
2.5. Stage 1: Acquisition of shares by downstream firms 38
2.6. Extensions 40
2.6.1. Effects of control 40
2.6.2. Non-discriminatory upstream prices 42
2.6.3. Simultaneous price setting 42
2.6.4. Two-part tariffs 43
2.6.5. Ineffective competition 45
2.6.6. Comparing passive backward with passive horizontal integration 46
2.7. Conclusion 46
Appendix: Proofs 48
51
Kapitel 3. The design of cartel damage compensations 52
3.1. Introduction 53
3.2. Related literature 55
3.3. Framework 56
3.4. Upstream cartel 57
3.4.1. Lost profit compensation 58
3.4.2. Overcharge compensation 61
4
INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 5
3.4.3. Non-exclusive linear upstream tariffs 62
3.4.4. Two-part tariffs 63
3.4.5. Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe 65
3.5. Downstream cartel 66
3.5.1. Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe 69
3.6. Extensions 69
3.6.1. Asymmetric information about the probability of compensation 69
3.6.2. Cartel stability 70
3.6.3. Endogenous detection 70
3.7. Conclusion 71
Appendix 72
Bibliography 74
Eidesstattliche Erklärung 78
Curriculum Vitae 79
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 6
General Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays in the field of competition economics. Chapter 1
contains an essay on resale price maintenance, co-authored by Johannes Muthers, doctoral
student at the University of Würzburg. Chapter 2 contains an essay on strategic backward
integration, co-authored by Lars-Hendrik Röller and Konrad Stahl. Chapter 3 contains
an essay on the design of damage compensations in case of competition law infringements
such as price cartels.
Each of the three essays is built around a game-theoretical model that is used to
analyze how the allocation of rights to profits and control over strategies within a vertical
chain influences the market outcome. The models provide insights in how arrangements,
such as resale price maintenance, can relax competition without increasing efficiency –
contrary to what is often argued in the existing literature. This yields new arguments to
competition policy for how to treat resale price maintenance, partial backward ownership
and cartel damage claims. Investigating the potential effects of such arrangements is in
line with the more economic approach in competition policy.
Game-theoretical models are helpful to structure and focus the thinking about the
complex interactions within vertically related markets. Yet, it is important to be aware
of the underlying explicit and implicit assumptions and thus limitations when using their
implications, both in competition policy and empirical tests of the theory.
Summary of the essay on resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for
retail services. In the essay on resale price maintenance, we investigate the incentives of
manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). We show
that if retail price competition is intense, manufacturers use minimum RPM to induce
favorable services through higher retail margins, whereas they use maximum RPM to
reduce double marginalization in case of weak retail competition. Compared to no RPM,
retail prices increase if minimum RPM is used and decrease if maximum RPM is used.
The use of minimum RPM can collectively hurt manufacturers although total industry
profits increase. The reason is that RPM intensifies the competition for favorable services.
With minimum RPM, diverting sales away from the other manufacturer is less costly than
without RPM as the manufacturer directly controls the retail margin.
Moreover, we show that the ability to use minimum RPM increases with the market
power of a manufacturer. In case of manufacturers with different degrees of market power,
the resulting asymmetric use of RPM tends to increase the asymmetry in margins and
thus services. If retail price competition is strong, consumers are matched with the high
priced product too often.
Finally, we show that although minimum RPM increases retail margins, it can reduce
the incentives of retailers to invest in the quality of their matching services. The reason is
that with RPM retailers have stronger ex-ante incentives to be uninformed about the con-
sumers’ preferences over the products. When less informed about product characteristics
and match values, retailers perceive the products as less differentiated. Hence, manu-
facturers compete harder for favorable services when retailers are less informed and thus
offer more attractive wholesale prices to the retailers. As manufacturers compete more
directly for favorable sales services with RPM, retailers invest less in information about
consumer preferences than without RPM. These results challenge the service argument
as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.
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Summary of the essay on strategic backward integration. In the essay on backward
integration, we analyze the effects of downstream firms’ acquisitions of passive ownership
in an efficient upstream supplier. Passive ownership involves pure cash flow rights, i.e.
claims on the target’s profits only, without controlling its decisions. We look at the pricing
decisions of firms in a horizontally differentiated downstream market, and in an upstream
homogeneous product market where firms produce at differing levels of marginal costs.
With an increasing participation in the profits of that efficient upstream supplier,
the acquiring downstream firm’s effective input price decreases as it receives a part of it
back through the participation in the supplier’s profits. The upstream supplier can thus
increase the price he charges that downstream firm. With upstream competition, the
effective price charged to the downstream firm cannot exceed the second efficient firm’s
marginal cost. Hence, the effective equilibrium upstream prices are not affected by passive
backward ownership.
Yet, as the downstream competitors are naturally served by the same efficient up-
stream firm, the acquirer also incorporates the effect of its own actions on the downstream
competitors’ sales. Its participation in the upstream supplier’s sales to competitors re-
duces its incentive to steal from the competing firms. It thus raises its price above the
price under vertical separation. Strategic complementarity in turn induces all downstream
competitors to increase their prices. Double marginalization is enhanced.
Whereas full vertical integration would lead to decreasing, passive backward ownership
leads to increasing downstream prices and is more profitable, as long as competition is
sufficiently intense. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control,
inducing the efficient supplier to commit to high prices. All results are sustained when
upstream suppliers are allowed to charge observable two part tariffs.
For competition policy, it is important to recognize that controlling backward owner-
ship does not necessarily raise more competitive concerns than passive backward owner-
ship, but that indeed the reverse can be the case.
Summary of the essay on the design of cartel damage compensations. In the third
essay, I study the effects of cartel damage compensation claims, which are supposed to
increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. Forcing infringers to pay
claimants the profit lost due to the infringement is the ex-post measure that achieves
full compensation. By investigating ex-ante incentives, I show that such a Lost Profit
Compensation can have completely undesirable allocative effects. These effects arise if
there is fringe competition upstream even if there is a cartel, e.g., due to imports or
in-house production.
In particular, Lost Profit Compensation claims of downstream firms against upstream
cartelists that do not monopolize the market can increase consumer prices. The reason
is that once a downstream firm expects a positive compensation, it is willing to purchase
from the cartelists at input prices above the competitive fringe cost. Hence the cartelists
increase input prices and, in best response to that, consumer prices increase as well. This
result is sustained with two-part tariffs as long as exclusivity clauses are not enforce-
able and there is sufficient price competition downstream. Moreover, the expected cartel
profits can increase due to the Lost Profit Compensation. The reason is that the claims
relax the constraints of the contracting problem between the upstream cartelists and each
downstream firm. Hence, industry profits increase and the cartelists can appropriate part
of that.
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Another surprising finding is that suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible
to compensation. The reason is that suppliers have to lower the prices that they charge
downstream cartelists to compensate these for expected compensation payments when
trading with them, as otherwise the cartelists source from the fringe. Yet the lower are
the marginal input prices of the efficient upstream firms, the more attractive it is for the
cartelists to source only one input from the fringe and order more from the other upstream
firm at the reduced price. Hence, the upstream firms need to lower their prices even more,
which benefits the cartelists, but hurts the suppliers.
All these results, which apply both for cartels and excessive pricing of dominant firms,
call for a more careful approach towards private enforcement of competition law.
KAPITEL 1
Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for
retail services
Matthias Hunold12 and Johannes Muthers3
Abstract. We investigate the incentives of manufacturers with common retailers to
use resale price maintenance (RPM). When retailers provide product specific pre-sales
services such as product information, minimum RPM is used by manufacturers who
compete for favorable services. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices, but can create
a prisoner’s dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even decreasing
the overall service level. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM
tends to distort the allocation of sales services towards the high-priced products of the
manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as
an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.
JEL classification: D83, L42
Keywords: biased sales advice, common agency, retail service, RPM, vertical restraints
1ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim and MaCCI, hunold@zew.de
2We thank participants at the JEI 2010, the MaCCI 2011 annual conference, the IIOC 2011, the IO
Workshop Lecce 2011, the 2011 annual conferences of the EARIE and the Verein für Socialpolitik, and
at seminars in Düsseldorf, Mannheim, Turunc and Würzburg, Firat Inceoglu, Martin Peitz, David Sauer,
Norbert Schulz, Yossi Spiegel, Konrad Stahl, and Sebastian Wismer for helpful comments and suggestions.
3University of Würzburg, johannes.muthers@uni-wuerzburg.de
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1.1. Introduction
There is a long debate on whether resale price maintenance (RPM) should be legal.
Although it is established that RPM can facilitate collusion,4 the US Supreme Court
overturned the long standing per-se illegality of minimum RPM with the Leegin decision
of 2007 and decided that minimum RPM has to be judged under the rule of reason.5 The
court argued that per-se illegality is not justified because minimum RPM can also benefit
consumers. In the EU, minimum and fixed RPM are still considered core restrictions
of competition.6 The guidelines now state, however, that inducing retailers to provide
pre-sales services may constitute an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.
The view that RPM may be beneficial is supported by economic theory: Retailers
do not internalize the positive effect of their services on competing retailers and the
manufacturer. A manufacturer uses minimum RPM to provide retailers with incentives
for services that would otherwise be under-provided, also from a social point of view. This
has been argued by Telser (1960) for sales advice, by Marvel and McCafferty (1984) for
quality certification and by Winter (1993) for shopping time reduction. Whereas these
models focus on a single manufacturer, we often observe that minimum RPM is imposed by
manufacturers on retailers who carry a wide range of different brands. Examples include
books, clothing, contact lenses, hearing devices, and household appliances.7 Retailers of
such products frequently offer services such as pre-sales advice.
A particular example is the aforementioned seminal Leegin case where competing man-
ufacturers of women apparel sold through common retailers. Elzinga and Mills (2009)
defend Leegin’s use of minimum RPM by emphasizing the role of sales associates with a
quote of Bear Stearns Equity Research: “[I]t is critical that sales associates know the mer-
chandise, have an understanding of the tastes and preferences of the target customer, and
can offer fashion and wardrobing advice.” Elzinga and Mills conclude that ”Leegin’s pol-
icy bears none of the marks of those economic theories of RPM that have anti-competitive
effects”.8
With this paper, we contribute a theory of how minimum RPM can hurt all consumers
– and even the manufacturers – when manufacturers compete for retail services. We show
that manufacturers use RPM to divert retailer services away from other to own products
even when the overall service level is not affected. Although minimum RPM increases
prices, it can reduce retailers’ incentives to invest in their services. Moreover, when
4See Marvel and McCafferty, 1984; Jullien and Rey, 2007; Rey and Vergé, 2010. RPM can also be used
by a manufacturer to exclude more efficient rivals (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2011 and references therein).
5Minimum RPM implies that retailers may not sell below a specific price. Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S., 2007.
6Hardcore restrictions are presumed illegal with the possibility for the firm to plead an efficiency defense.
See Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 (2010), Article 4a and the EU Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints (2010/C 130/01); Paragraph 223 of the guidelines states that an efficiency defense in terms
of Article 101,3 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) is possible also for minimum
and fixed RPM. Par. 224 and 225 contain examples of potentially detrimental and beneficial practices.
7See Elzinga and Mills (2009) for a discussion of services in the Leegin case. Other recent RPM cases with
common retailers and products where pre-sale advice potentially matters include contact lenses (see fine
“Bußgeldbescheid B 3 - 123/08,” German Federal Cartel Office, September 2009), hearing devices (press
release “Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen Hörgerätehersteller Phonak GmbH,” German Federal
Cartel Office, October 2009.), and household appliances (see press release “Bundeskartellamt verhängt
Bußgelder wegen unzulässiger Preisbindung,” German Federal Cartel Office, 2003).
8We agree with Elzinga and Mills (2009) that the existing service arguments are essentially pro-
competitive. One should bear in mind, though, that Elzinga was a testifying expert in the Leegin
case for the pro-rule-of-reason side. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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manufacturers have asymmetric market power, minimum RPM induces retailers to divert
services towards products of manufacturers with more market power.
We set up a model with two differentiated manufacturers and two common retailers.
Each consumer is interested in buying only one of the products, but is initially unaware
of which product fits his preferences best. Similar to Mathewson and Winter (1984), we
assume that consumers rely on the retailers’ services to match them with products through
recommendations, demonstrations, and general advice. Without RPM, each manufacturer
can only use the wholesale price to influence both, the price consumers have to pay as well
as the retail margin, and thereby service incentives. RPM as an additional instrument
allows a manufacturer to target consumer prices and retail margins independently.
In a first step we hold each retailer’s overall service level fixed and only allow retailers
to shift services between the products. To focus on competition for services, we initially
abstract from direct price competition between manufacturers. We show that if retail
price competition is intense, manufacturers use minimum RPM to induce favorable ser-
vices through higher retail margins, whereas in case of weak retail competition they use
maximum RPM to reduce double marginalization. Instead, with RPM the intensity of
retail price competition does not affect the equilibrium outcome as manufacturers fix the
retail margins. For the incentives to deviate from the maintained price and cut or increase
the retail price, however, it matters whether a retailer can attract many customers from
its competitor or not, which yields either minimum or maximum RPM. Compared to no
RPM, retail prices increase exactly if minimum RPM is used and decrease if maximum
RPM is used, which is a non-trivial result as both wholesale and retail prices generally
depend on whether RPM is employed.9
Interestingly, minimum RPM can collectively hurt the manufacturers although total
industry profits increase. The reason is that RPM intensifies the competition for favorable
services. With minimum RPM, diverting sales away from the other manufacturer is less
costly than without RPM as the manufacturer directly controls the retail margin. Indeed,
with linear wholesale tariffs and linear demand, minimum RPM implies a reduction in
manufacturers’ profits and benefits retailers, when compared to no RPM.
This prisoner’s dilemma has some resemblance with those of dissipative advertising
and paying for prominence (Armstrong and Zhou, 2011), but is nevertheless distinctively
different: First, minimum RPM, though intensifying manufacturer competition, increases
industry profits, whereas dissipative advertising is by definition wasteful and undesirable
for the industry. Second, the benchmark for the dilemma is that manufacturers compete
in wholesale prices for favorable services when competing retailers set retail prices, unlike
the benchmark of no retail margins and no service incentives in Armstrong and Zhou
(2011). Our dilemma result is important for competition policy because it contradicts the
gist of the existing literature as well as policy debates that minimum RPM is beneficial
for manufacturers, when compared to no RPM.
In a second step, we allow for asymmetric market power by introducing a third manu-
facturer who offers a perfect substitute to the product of one of the manufacturers, say B.
Manufacturer B cannot offer supra-competitive margins to the retailers because the third
manufacturer would profitably undercut. As a consequence, only manufacturer A can ef-
fectively use RPM as only manufacturer A has market power. The resulting asymmetric
9For example, Perry and Besanko (1991) show that minimum RPM may yield lower prices and maximum
RPM higher prices compared to no RPM.
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use of RPM tends to increase the asymmetry in margins and thus services. If retailer
competition is sufficiently strong, consumers are matched with the high priced product
too often. Banning RPM can reduce this distortion.
In a third step, we allow each retailer to initially invest in the overall level of its
matching services. One may think of educating sales personnel to become more aware
about the product characteristics and consumers’ preferences. Investing more yields more
precise information about which product suits which consumer. Although conventional
wisdom suggests that minimum RPM, which increases the retail margins, induces retailers
to invest more in service, we find that equilibrium investments are lower with minimum
RPM than without it. The reason is that with RPM retailers have stronger ex-ante in-
centives to be uninformed about the consumers’ preferences over the products. When less
informed about product characteristics and match values, retailers perceive the products
as less differentiated. Hence, manufacturers compete harder for favorable services when
retailers are less informed and thus offer more attractive wholesale prices to the retailers.
As manufacturers compete more directly for favorable sales services with RPM, retailers
invest less in information about consumer preferences than without RPM.
As mentioned earlier, in most of the literature on service and RPM the authors focus
on a single manufacturer and argue that minimum RPM allows the retailer to internalize
the positive effects of its services on the manufacturer’s profits (Winter, 1993) or on the
sales of other retailers (Telser, 1960).10 From a social welfare perspective, a monopoly
manufacturer may nevertheless induce too little or even too much services, as it aligns
services with preferences of marginal consumers rather than the average consumer pur-
chasing. The dominating conclusion of this literature on RPM and services is that the
positive effects of RPM are expected to prevail; see Winter (2009) for a recent discussion.
By studying two manufacturers and two common retailers who provide matching services,
we show that all consumers can be worse off with RPM.
Perry and Besanko (1991) study how two manufacturers use minimum RPM to com-
pete for exclusive (i.e., single product) retailers. They argue that prices are lower with
minimum RPM than with maximum RPM. Their comparison is special, however, in that
they compare minimum RPM with franchise fees to maximum RPM with linear wholesale
tariffs. Similarly, Shaffer (1994) compares two-part tariffs and no RPM with linear tariffs
and RPM in case of one strategic manufacturer. Focusing on linear tariffs, we instead
endogenously determine whether manufacturers impose minimum or maximum RPM on
common retailers and find that prices are higher if manufacturers use minimum RPM.
Our understanding that common retailers divert demand to more profitable products
is related to the articles of Raskovich (2007) as well as Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) on
product advice, which also rely on linear tariffs. However, these authors do not consider
price competition between retailers and the incentives of a manufacturer to relax this
competition by using RPM, which is central to our argument.
We are aware of two articles on RPM in a setting with differentiated manufacturers
and common retailers, but neither addresses service. Dobson and Waterson (2007) study
bilateral Nash-bargaining between each manufacturer-retailer pair over a linear wholesale
price. They find that if retailers have all the bargaining power, retail prices are higher with
10Several articles study RPM in the context of spillovers in case of stock-outs (Deneckere et al., 1997,
1996; Krishnan and Winter, 2007; Wang, 2004). Wang actually has two manufacturers, but exclusive
retailers in Bertrand competition and finds that total surplus increases with RPM.
1.2. MODEL 13
RPM. If, instead, manufacturers possess all the bargaining power, retail prices are lower
with RPM.11 Rey and Vergé (2010) show that the monopolization result of Bernheim and
Whinston (1985) with a common retailer and two-part tariffs offered by manufacturers
can be extended to competing common retailers if manufacturers can additionally use
RPM.
1.2. Model
Two symmetric manufacturers (i = A,B) sell their differentiated products to two
symmetric common retailers (k = 1, 2) who in turn sell the products to final consumers.
Each consumer is interested in buying only one of the two products, but is initially
unaware of which product fits his preferences best. Similar to Mathewson and Winter
(1984), we assume that consumers rely on the retailers’ services to match them with
products through recommendations, demonstrations, and general advice.
We assume that more retailer service allocated to product i increases the demand for
this product at both retailers. Initially, we will assume that the overall level of services
that each retailer can provide is fixed; in Subsection 1.3.4 we relax this assumption and
endogenize the overall level of services that the retailers offer. Hence, if retailer k allocates
to product A a fraction sk ∈ [0, 1] of his services, the fraction he allocates to product B
is 1− sk. If sk > (<) 1/2, retailer k biases his services towards product A (B). If sk =1/2,
retailer k allocates services equally to the two products.
Using pi,k to denote the price retailer k charges for product i, and using −k to denote
the rival retailer, we assume that the demand for product i at retailer k is given by
(1.2.1) Di,k ≡Mi(sk, s−k) di,k(pi,k, pi,−k),
where ∂di,k
∂pi,k
< 0, ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
> 0 and |∂di,k
∂pi,k
| > ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
.12 Notice that di,k(pi,k, pi,−k) depends only
on the prices that the two retailers charge for product i, but it is independent of the
prices charged for product −i. Hence there is no direct price competition between the
manufacturers. This feature of our model ensures that manufacturers’ strategic delegation
of pricing to retailers does not affect our results as in Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and
Rey and Stiglitz (1995), so we can isolate the effects of service competition. We show in
Subsection 1.3.6 that relaxing this assumption yields qualitatively the same results.
The demand structure stated in (1.2.1) allows us to separate the pricing of the products
from the service decisions. One can think aboutMi(sk, s−k) as the mass of consumers who
consider buying product i given the services that the two retailers allocate to product i,
and di,k(pi,k, pi,−k) as the quantity of product i that such a consumer buys from retailer k.
The following Example contains a micro-foundation that is consistent with this demand
system.
Example 1.1. In line with Mathewson and Winter (1984), assume that only a con-
sumer who is presented by the retailer with a product learns about the product’s existence
and its characteristics. Assume that consumers initially randomly select either retailer
to get informed about products. Each consumer will only consider buying if the product
is suitable. If the product is not suitable, assume for simplicity that consumers do not
11Dobson and Waterson do not analyze cases with intermediate bargaining power and whether manufac-
turers would like to use RPM. See their footnote 26.
12We will suppress the arguments of (1.2.1) when this does not cause confusion.
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consider the other product.13 Hence a retailer has an incentive to present each consumer
with the product which actually suits him. In line with the service and RPM literature,
in particular also Mathewson and Winter (1984), we moreover assume that price search
is costless, so consumers know the prices of a product at both retailers once they have
learned the product characteristics. Each retailer decides which product to present based
on noisy information about the consumer’s preferences. Each retailer knows the proba-
bility q ∼ U [0, 1] with which a particular consumer likes product B, and correspondingly
product A. Both retailers have the same information about a consumer. Each retailer’s
product presentation decision (which is a function from q to the space of products) boils
down to choosing a threshold probability sk, such that the retailer presents consumers
with product A for q < sk and with product B for q > sk. Assuming that that each
consumer who is matched to a specific product has linear-quadratic utility over buying
units of that product at either retailer,14 we derive the following demand parametrization:
MA =
∑
k (2sk − s2k), MB =
∑
k (1− s2k) and di,k = 1− (β + γ) pi,k + γ pi,−k with β, γ > 0.
See Appendix B for more details.
Throughout we maintain the following assumptions for the reduced form demand
stated in (1.2.1):
Assumption 1. Mi is strictly concave with ∂MA∂sk > 0 >
∂MB
∂sk
and symmetric around
1/2: Mi(s1, s2) = M−i(1− s1, 1− s2).15
The concavity and symmetry of Mi(s1, s2) imply that allocating services unevenly to
the two products reduces the aggregate MA +MB.16 Furthermore,
Assumption 2. The effect of a retailer’s service allocation on Mi is independent of
the other retailer’s service: ∂2Mi
∂s1∂s2
= 0, i = A,B.
Finally, to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium when retailers set prices, we
assume that the Hessian matrix of di,k has a negative and dominant main diagonal:
Assumption 3. ∂
2di,k
(∂pi,k)2 ≤ 0 ,
∂2di,k
(∂pi,−k)2 ≤ 0 ,
∂2di,k
∂pi,k∂pi,−k
≥ 0,
∣∣∣ ∂2di,k(∂pi,k)2 ∣∣∣ ≥ ∂2di,k∂pi,k∂pi,−k .17
We assume that services are non-contractible and we study how the manufacturers
can affect the retail services through RPM. We assume that if manufacturer i imposes
RPM and restricts the retail price to pi, it must be maintained by both retailers.18 The
sequence of events is as follows:
(1) Each manufacturer i ∈ A,B sets a wholesale price wi, and optionally fixes pi
under RPM.
13This can for example be motivated with increasing search costs and is particularly meaningful if there
are more than two products, as is typically the case in practise.
14This assumption implies that consumers are not locked in the retailer who informs them. It is not
necessary, but simplifies the computations.
15Strict concavity is convenient but our results are also valid as long as aMi + bM−i is strictly quasi-
concave for a, b > 0 and s1, s2 ∈ (0, 1).
16The following assumptions on derivatives apply strictly only for the relevant range whereMi and di,k are
positive. Strict concavity of Mi in sk implies strict concavity of MA +MB . By symmetry, MB(s1, s2) =
MA(1 − s1, 1 − s2). Thus ∂∂sk (MA(s1, s2) +MB(s1, s2)) = ∂∂sk (MA(s1, s2) +MA(1− s1, 1− s2)). This
derivative is zero at sk = 0.5, which by strict concavity is the unique maximizer of MA +MB .
17Assumption 3 implies that demand is weakly concave in prices.
18We focus here on a symmetric treatment of the retailers, as is common in the literature on RPM.
Within the present setting, this is also optimal for each manufacturer.
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(2) Each retailer k ∈ 1, 2 observes the manufacturers’ prices, chooses the service
allocation sk, and sets its own retail prices pi,k. Under RPM, pi,k = pi.
(3) Demand is realized.
Similar to Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) and Dobson and Waterson (2007), we will consider
linear wholesale tariffs; this avoids non-existence problems as in Rey and Vergé (2010)
and avoids to confound our service effects with their common agency effects.19
Normalizing all costs of manufacturing and retailing to zero, the profit of manufacturer
i is given by
(1.2.2) pii ≡ wi
∑
k=1,2
Di,k,
and the profit of retailer k by
(1.2.3) Πk ≡
∑
i=A,B
(pi,k − wi)Di,k.
In the next section we solve the game for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, without and
with RPM. We focus on symmetric equilibria, apart from Subsection 1.3.5, where we allow
for asymmetric market power.
1.3. Analysis
1.3.1. Equilibrium without resale price maintenance. Assume for this subsec-
tion that manufacturers can only set wholesale prices, but cannot use RPM. For given
wholesale prices, each retailer k chooses pA,k, pB,k and sk to maximize Πk. The first order
condition (FOC) for the retail price is
(1.3.1) ∂Πk
∂pi,k
= di,k + (pi,k − wi)∂di,k
∂pi,k
= 0,
which is given our assumptions independent of s1 and s2 as well as of the wholesale and
retail prices of product −i. Denote by p∗i (wi) the equilibrium retail price for product
i. The dominance of the own price effect and the assumption on weak concavity of di,k
imply that the pass through rate, ∂p∗i /∂wi, is positive and below one. Hence the retail
profitability (p∗i − wi) di,k (p∗i , p∗i ) decreases with wi.
The FOC with respect to sk is
(1.3.2) ∂Πk
∂sk
= ∂Mi
∂sk
(pi,k − wi) di,k + ∂M−i
∂sk
(p−i,k − w−i) d−i,k = 0.
The FOC (1.3.2) together with the strict concavity of Mi (Assumption 2) implies that
retailer k sets sk to shift demand towards the more profitable product. If the products are
equally profitable, each retailer maximizes profits by maximizing the mass of attracted
consumers: MA + MB. From the strict concavity and symmetry of MA and MB follows
that each retailer chooses sk = 1/2 as this maximizes MA +MB.
Using s∗k(wA, wB) to denote the equilibrium service decisions and by M∗i (wi, w−i) ≡
Mi (s∗1, s∗2) the corresponding mass of attracted consumers, we summarize in
Lemma 1.1. Without RPM, there exists a unique equilibrium of the continuation game
– starting in stage 2 – in which the retailers’ decisions are symmetric. In particular
19For delegated common agencies Rey and Vergé point out that common agency equilibria fail to exist
because the binding participation constraint for a retailer to sell the product of a manufacturer can always
be profitably undermined by the other manufacturer.
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(1) the retail price p∗i increases in wi and is independent of w−i and sk.
(2) the retail profitability (p∗i − wi) di,k (p∗i , p∗i ) decreases in wi.
(3) the equilibrium matches M∗i decrease in wi. If wA = wB, then s∗1 = s∗2 = 1/2.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A. 
We now turn to stage 1. Taking the retailer continuation equilibrium into account,
each manufacturer solves
(1.3.3) max
wi
pii = wiM∗i (wi, w−i)
∑
k
di,k(p∗i (wi), p∗i (wi)),
facing a trade-off between price and quantity.
Equation (1.3.3) shows that an increase in wi increases the manufacturer’s margin, but
decreases demand in two ways: First, the retail profitability decreases so that retailers
allocate services to product −i and thus attract fewer consumers to product i. Second,
the retail prices of product i increase and hence the attracted consumers buy less quantity
of that product.
The FOC implied by (1.3.3), evaluated at symmetric wholesale prices wA = wB = wN
and symmetric retail prices pi,k = pN for all i, k, can be written as
wN = − di,k(p
N , pN)(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
) ,(1.3.4)
and the FOC (1.3.1) evaluated at symmetric retail prices as
(1.3.5) pN = p∗i (wN) = wN −
di,k(pN , pN)
∂di,k(pN , pN)/∂pi,k
,
where
λ = ∂M/∂sk
M
× ∂M/∂sk−∂2M/∂s2k
> 0(1.3.6)
and M ≡MA(1/2, 1/2) = MB(1/2, 1/2).
In what follows, we restrict attention to demand functions that give rise to quasi-
concave reduced-form manufacturer profits and a stable interior equilibrium such that
implicit differentiation of the manufacturer FOCs can be applied.20
The lower λ, the more consumers the retailer loses when focusing service on one
product. The first factor of λ measures the fraction of the mass of consumers that is
shifted by a change in sk. The second factor measures how much total mass is lost for
a given shift of consumer mass. The higher the second derivative of Mi is in absolute
value, the lower the gain in consumers compared to the loss of attracted consumers for
the other product, and the lower is λ. In summary, a lower λ means that the products
are less substitutable for a retailer when allocating services.
For λ = 0, products are not substitutable for a retailer and the equilibrium prices
implied by (1.3.4) and (1.3.5) are as if there were no retail service decisions. As λ in-
creases, manufacturer competition for favorable retail services drives the wholesale price
wN towards zero and increases the retail margin pN − wN .
20 This holds for the parametrization in Example 1.
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Proposition 1.1. In any symmetric equilibrium without RPM the wholesale prices
wN and retail prices pN are defined by (1.3.4) and (1.3.5), and service is allocated sym-
metrically, i.e., s∗k = 1/2. The prices wN and pN decrease in λ, whereas retail profits
increase in λ.
For the demand parametrization in Example 1 the symmetric equilibrium is unique.21
1.3.2. Equilibrium with resale price maintenance. For this subsection, assume
that RPM is enforceable. Both manufacturers have weak incentives to use RPM because
a manufacturer who unilaterally fixes the retail price can reproduce the equilibrium prices
without RPM by setting pRi = pN and wRi = wN and is thus at least as well off as without
RPM. Manufacturer i fixing both wi and pi faces the following trade-offs:
• increasing wi increases its own margin, but decreases the retail margin pi − wi
and thus induces retailers to allocate services away from product i;
• increasing pi increases the retail margin and thus retailers allocate more services
to product i. A higher pi also implies that attracted consumers buy less quantity
of product i.
With RPM, a manufacturer can adjust its wholesale price to trade off its own mar-
gin and retail service incentives without affecting the retail price. With the additional
instrument of RPM the manufacturer can thus separate the product’s optimal retail pric-
ing from the provision of service incentives to the retailers. Hence each manufacturer
maximizes joint rents from selling its product by fixing a price of
(1.3.7) pM ≡ arg max
pi
∑
k
pi di,k(pi, pi).
Focusing again on demand functions that give rise to interior solutions yields
Proposition 1.2. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with
(1.3.8) pR = pM , wR = p
M
1 + λ.
Service is allocated symmetrically and the retail margin increases in λ.
Having characterized the equilibrium prices and service decisions both with and with-
out RPM, we now compare them to evaluate the effects of RPM on profits and welfare.
1.3.3. Competitive effects of resale price maintenance. An interesting question
is under which circumstances RPM increases or decreases retail prices. With RPM, the
retail price always equals pM , whereas without RPM, the retail price pN depends on both
the intensity of manufacturer and of retail competition. Comparing pN and pM yields
Proposition 1.3. The retail prices under RPM are higher than the prices when no
manufacturer uses RPM if and only if
(1.3.9) λ > λM ≡ −∂ di,k(p
M , pM)
∂ pi,k
/
∂ di,k(pM , pM)
∂ pi,−k
− 1.
21For linear di,k (as in Example 1) the right hand side of (1.3.4) is monotone in the price level, which
ensures that wN and pN are unique.
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Correspondingly, RPM decreases retail prices if and only if the above inequality is re-
versed. At λ = λM , pN = pM .22
The more exchangeable the retailers are from the consumer’s perspective, the smaller
is the right hand side of (1.3.9) and thus retail price competition. The more exchangeable
the products are for the retailers when allocating services, the larger is λ on the left hand
side of (1.3.9) and the more intense is the competition of manufacturers for favorable
services. Hence, if competition among manufacturers and retailers is sufficiently intense,
the price level without RPM is lower than the level with RPM.
We model RPM as fixing the retail price at a particular level. But for competition
policy it is important to distinguish the effects of minimum and maximum RPM on retail
prices and total surplus. For the distinction of minimum and maximum RPM it is not
sufficient to compare the price level with and without RPM and argue that if prices with
RPM are higher, then it must be minimum RPM, and maximum RPM otherwise. The
reason is that the wholesale prices generally depend on whether RPM is in place or not.
For instance, the wholesale price in case of RPM can be lower than without RPM. In the
RPM regime, the retailers may thus individually want to decrease the retail price, even
if it is fixed below the level they would choose in the case without RPM.
Yet if RPM imposes a binding constraint on retailers, it acts either as a price floor or
a price ceiling. Whether the manufacturers use minimum and maximum RPM can thus
be identified by answering the question: Would a retailer at the equilibrium prices with
RPM benefit from reducing or from increasing its retail price? By evaluating a retailer’s
marginal profit with respect to its retail prices at the equilibrium values {wR, pR} we
obtain
Proposition 1.4. In equilibrium, manufacturers use minimum RPM if and only if
λ > λM . Manufacturers use maximum RPM if and only if λ < λM . Compared to the
regime without RPM, minimum RPM always increases retail prices and maximum RPM
always decreases retail prices. The equilibrium allocation of services is not affected by
RPM.
At λ = λM , the equilibria with and without RPM coincide (p∗(wN) = pM , wN = wR)
and RPM is a superfluous instrument. When raising λ above λM , the wholesale prices
both with and without RPM decrease (Propositions 1.1 and 1.2). In turn, RPM implies a
price floor because each retailer individually prefers to set a price below pM . Analogously,
for λ < λM , wholesale prices are higher and maximum RPM restricts the retail price to
pM because retailers individually prefer to raise prices further.
We can derive from Proposition 1.4 a simple optimal policy in case the retail service
level for the product category can be assumed to be fixed: forbid minimum RPM because
it unambiguously increases retail prices and leaves the equilibrium service allocation un-
changed, but allow maximum RPM as it decreases prices. In the next subsection, we
investigate the effects of RPM on investments in the overall service level. But before
doing so, let us consider the effects of RPM on manufacturer and retailer profits.
22Although the symmetric equilibrium is not necessarily globally unique, at λ = λM equation (1.3.9)
uniquely defines the price pN . Starting from this locally unique symmetric equilibrium, the monotone
comparative statics of pN in λ allow us to compare the symmetric equilibrium prices with and without
RPM globally and unambiguously. However, asymmetric equilibria in which one product has a lower
wholesale price and higher service and the other has a higher wholesale price and lower services cannot
generally be ruled out.
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Are manufacturers better off when minimum RPM is enforceable? Recall that the
unilateral introduction of RPM is always weakly profitable for a manufacturer as it yields
direct control over the retail margin. However, this additional control induces manufac-
turers to compete harder for retail services. Collectively, manufacturers can thus be worse
off, even if industry profits increase through RPM. The next remark characterizes this
case.
Remark 1.1. The equilibrium profit of a manufacturer under the regime with enforce-
able RPM is lower than under the regime without RPM if wR di,k(pR, pR) < wN di,k(pN , pN).
The inequality in Proposition 1.1 is independent of Mi, which is the same in any
symmetric equilibrium. Minimum RPM implies pR > pN (Proposition 1.4) and, in turn,
lower demand because di,k decreases when both retail prices increase, i.e., di,k(pR, pR) <
di,k(pN , pN). Thus a sufficient condition for minimum RPM to impose a prisoner’s dilemma
is that the wholesale price is weakly lower with RPM. Unfortunately, with only implicit
definitions of wR and wN it is difficult to establish general conditions for wR ≤ wN . Using
a linear parametrization of di,k, we obtain
Example 1.2. Assume that demand is linear in prices as in Example 1.1. If minimum
(maximum) RPM results in equilibrium, the manufacturers’ profits are lower (higher)
than in the regime without RPM. Retailers benefit from minimum RPM and suffer from
maximum RPM (see Appendix A for the derivation).
Without RPM, a manufacturer has to decrease the wholesale price to increase the retail
margin. But when faced with lower input costs, the retailers lower the retail prices, which
decreases the retail margin again and thereby affects the product’s overall profitability.
The manufacturer thus targets two goals with only one instrument, which makes it costly
for the manufacturer to induce favorable services. Instead, with minimum RPM as another
instrument, a manufacturer can prevent retailers from lowering the retail price and in turn
manufacturers compete more directly and thus more fiercely for favorable services.
A caveat applies as the dilemma result is derived for linear wholesale tariffs. With two-
part tariffs, a manufacturer can generally extract retail rents with an upfront-payment,
but has to ensure that a retailer prefers carrying its product over exclusively carrying
the other product. This trade-off and thus the retailer’s outside option to carrying the
product generally depend on whether RPM is used in the industry, hence it is an open
question whether the dilemma ceases to exist.23
1.3.4. Investments in the service level. For a fixed overall service level, we have
shown that manufacturers competing for service use minimum RPM to increase consumer
prices even without any welfare benefit. Conventional wisdom suggests that minimum
RPM induces retailers to invest more in services. By contrast, we provide an argument
how minimum RPM reduces the incentives of retailers to invest in services, although
minimum RPM increases the retail margin. Towards this we now allow each retailer to
invest in the level (i.e., quality) of its matching services. Retailers decide how much to
invest in a new initial stage, after which investments become public knowledge and the
game proceeds as before. This timing implies that manufacturers observe the service level
and can change prices more easily than retailers can change the service level.
23See also footnote 21.
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Recall that each consumer likes only one of the products, but is ex-ante uninformed
about the existence of the products. The retailer matches each consumer to a product. We
build upon Example 1 where a retailer has only imperfect information on which product
a consumer likes, and allow each retailer to invest in the quality of this information. For
instance, the retailer can train the sales agents to be better informed about the products
so that they know which product fits a particular consumer’s need.
Formally, each consumer is of one of two types: he either values product A or B, but
not both. Each retailer can invest in information precision αk, which represents the share
of consumers whose type the retailer knows with certainty.
A retailer’s probability assessment q that a consumer likes product B (and with 1− q
product A) has full support on [0, 1] with mass points of αk/2 at 0 and 1. We assume that
the remaining mass 1 − αk is uniformly distributed in the interior (0, 1) as in Example
1. The parameter sk is again the cut-off probability such that for higher q ∈ (0, 1)
retailer k matches the consumer to product B instead of A. Assuming that the mass of
each consumer type at each retailer is 1, the mass of consumers successfully matched to
product A as a function of service levels and allocations is given by
(1.3.10) MA(α1, α2, s1, s2) ≡
∑
k∈{1,2}
[
αk + (1− αk) 2
(
sk − s2k/2
)]
.
The mass of attracted consumers, MA, clearly increases in α1 and α2 (the same holds
for MB). Note that the assumptions on Mi, i.e., concavity and symmetry around 1/2, are
met. See Appendix B for more details on the derivation of MA and MB.
We also maintain the assumption that manufacturers set uniform wholesale prices.
The subgame equilibrium prices
(
pN , wN , pR, wR
)
are characterized as before and are
not directly affected by αk, but only indirectly through λ.24 For any αk, k ∈ {1, 2},
equilibrium service allocations are s∗k = 1/2 as before. The relation between αk and λ is
given by
(1.3.11) λ (α1, α2) ≡ 2− α1 − α26 + α1 + α2
with ∂λ/∂αk < 0.25 Let us from now on suppress the arguments of λ and use M˜i(α1, α2) ≡
Mi(α1, α2, s1 = 1/2, s2 = 1/2) for the equilibrium mass contingent on investments. The
equilibrium prices with and without RPM are denoted by wl(λ) and pl(λ), l ∈ {R,N}.
Hence, in the investment stage, each retailer solves
max
αk
Πk =
∑
i∈{A,B}
M˜i(αk, α−k) [(pl(λ)− wl(λ)) di,k(pl(λ), pl(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail profitability
]− C(αk),
where C(αk) denotes the investment costs as a function of the overall service level, assumed
to be increasing and well behaved to ensure unique interior solutions.26
The retailer faces a trade-off when choosing αk: More precise information on consumer
types increase sales through M˜i, but the product substitutability λ decreases in αk. By
investing less, a retailer commits to perceive the products of the manufacturers as more
substitutable, which invites the manufacturers to offer lower wholesale prices. So even
24Note that for a given λ the expressions (1.3.4), (1.3.5),(1.3.7), and (1.3.8) are independent of Mi.
25Expression (1.3.11) is derived by plugging (1.3.10) in the definition of λ in (1.4.5).
26In particular, assume that C increases in αk with C ′(0) = 0, C ′(1) =∞ and C ′′ > 0.
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without investment costs, a retailer will not necessarily choose the maximal information
precision.
Comparing the equilibrium service levels with and without RPM, with di,k linear in
prices, we obtain
Proposition 1.5. If demand is linear in prices and the uncertain information q is
uniformly distributed on (0, 1), the equilibrium service level α∗k, k ∈ {1, 2}, is lower with
RPM.
Because of manufacturer competition, each retailer has an incentive to be uninformed
about which product fits which consumer. When uninformed about the suitability of a
product to a consumer, a retailer simply advises the consumer to buy the product that
is most profitable to the retailer. Thus manufacturers compete harder for favorable sales
advice of uninformed retailers.
With RPM, the manufacturers directly controls the products’ retail profitabilities
and therefore compete more immediately for retail services. With RPM, it is thus more
profitable for a retailer to invite manufacturer competition by investing less in information.
1.3.5. Asymmetric market power and resale price maintenance. In this sub-
section we examine the effect of market power on the allocation of services. To this end
we assume that product B is produced by two different manufacturers. Without RPM,
Bertrand competition between the manufacturers of B forces the wholesale prices of that
product to zero. This implies a retail price of p∗(0) for product B (Lemma 1.1).
Manufacturer A earns positive profits by setting a positive wholesale price. As the
retail profitability decreases in a product’s wholesale price (Lemma 1.1), retailers divert
demand to product B in equilibrium. Without RPM, retailers thus allocate more services
to product B.
Now assume that RPM is admitted. By nature of perfect competition, the manufac-
turers of product B cannot effectively increase the retail price with RPM. To see this,
assume to the contrary that both manufacturers offer tariffs with wholesale prices of zero
and a fixed retail price different from p∗(0), which implies that they effectively use RPM.
This cannot be an equilibrium as a manufacturer of product B could profitably offer a
contract with a slightly positive wholesale price and let retailers choose the price. Each
retailer strictly prefers such an offer as it can play its best response to the other retailer.
Lemma 1.2. In any equilibrium, wB = 0 and pB,1 = pB,2 = p∗(0). It is an equilibrium
that each manufacturer of product B offers wB = 0 and does not fix the retail price.27
Lemma 1.2 implies that the perfectly substitutable manufacturers of product B cannot
effectively use RPM. Hence the retail profitability on product B is not affected by the
enforceability of RPM.
The profitability of product A generally depends on whether manufacturer A uses
RPM. Faced with the same equilibrium prices on product B independent of whether
RPM is feasible, manufacturer A is at least as well off when fixing the retail price. With
RPM, manufacturer A sets pA = pM to maximize the overall profitability on product A
and sets a positive wA by trading off the own margin and retailers’ service incentives.
27Both manufacturers of B setting wB = 0 and fixing pB = p∗(0) is not necessarily an equilibrium as one
manufacturer could offer wB ≥ 0 and fix a much higher pB and possibly be accepted by both retailers.
Moreover, there is no equilibrium in strictly mixed strategies with RPM.
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To understand the effects of RPM on prices and service allocations, consider two polar
cases: retail monopolies vs. close substitutes (i.e., small competitive retail margins). A
monopoly retailer faced with input costs of wB = 0 sets the profit maximizing price
pB = pM . Hence in case of retail monopolies, the retail profitability is maximal on
product B and strictly smaller on product A as wA > wB = 0 and pA = pB = pM . Thus
service is excessively allocated to product B, although double marginalization on product
A is reduced. By contrast, in case of fierce retail competition the profitability on product
B is arbitrarily low and manufacturer A uses RPM to raise the retail margin and thereby
the profitability of A over that of B. Hence service is allocated more to product A in
equilibrium. In this case, RPM raises the price level of product A and yields that services
are allocated excessively to the more expensive product.
Proposition 1.6. Assume that two manufacturers sell product B and one manufac-
turer sells product A. If RPM is not enforceable, service is allocated more to product B
than to the more expensive product A. If RPM is enforceable and retailers are close sub-
stitutes, product A is more expensive than product B and services are allocated more to
product A.
The case with fierce retail competition and enforceable RPM exhibits that A has a
high, manufacturer-maintained retail price and is favorably sold by retailers, whereas
product B is both less expensive and less endowed with services, e.g., is less advised or
advertised. For instance, A could be a branded product and B a private label which can be
produced by several manufacturers. Interestingly, the price-service differential (high price
& high service vs. low price & low service) is not caused by different product qualities
(vertical differentiation), but by asymmetric market power at the manufacturer level.
1.3.6. Direct inter-brand price competition. The assumption of no direct cross
price effects between products A and B simplified the previous exposition, but is certainly
not always realistic. In this section we show that also under direct price competition, man-
ufacturers use minimum RPM to increases prices even without any benefit to consumers
and minimum RPM can create a prisoner’s dilemma to manufacturers.
We allow for cross price effects between the products of the different manufacturers
by allowing di,k to depend on the retail prices of product −i. We focus on perfect retailer
competition with discrete money. Perfect retail competition ensures that minimum RPM
is used in equilibrium and strategic delegation of pricing is not relevant. Discrete money
ensures that retailers have a positive equilibrium margin even without RPM so that the
service decision is meaningful.28 Denoting the smallest unit of money by 4 > 0, the
competitive retail margins equal 4.29 Clearly, the translation from wholesale to retail
price is ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
= 1.
Formally, because of perfect retail competition the total quantity demanded of product
i only depends on the lowest price for each product: Di = Mi di(pA = min(pA,1, pA,2), pB =
min(pB,1, pB,2)), presumed to satisfy
Assumption 4. The own price effect is dominant and the Hessian matrix of di has a
negative dominant main diagonal.
28If a retailer makes zero margins on both products, he makes zero profits with every service allocation.
29One can equivalently assume that money is continuous so that retailers make zero margins, but that
retailers, given that they make zero profits anyway, maximize the quantity of sales.
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Assuming that for pi,k = pi,−k the demanded quantity distributes equally over retailers,
without RPM each retailer’s profit reduces to 1/24∑iMidi. A manufacturer can still
influence service incentives by lowering its wholesale price as this increases di. Yet there
is now one additional effect: The demand for product −i increases in the retail prices of
product i. Hence retailers shift more services to product −i in response to a retail price
increase of product i. Solving for the wholesale price analogously to Proposition 1.1 yields
wN =
di
(
pN , pN
)
−∂di(pN ,pN )
∂pi
(1 + λ) + λ∂d−i(pN ,pN )
∂pi
(1.3.12)
with di,k evaluated at pN . As 4 → 0, pN → wN . We assume that 4 is very small and
use pN ≈ wN from now on. Following analogously the steps of the proof to Proposition
1.2 yields wR = pR1+λ as before and
(1.3.13) pR =
di,k
(
pR, pR
)
(1 + λ)
−∂di(pR,pR)
∂pi
(1 + λ) + ∂d−i(pR,pR)
∂pi
λ
.
Comparing (1.3.12) and (1.3.13) and using Assumption 4 reveals that pR > pN and
wR < wN . Hence RPM implies a prisoner’s dilemma for the manufacturers as both
manufacturer margins and sales quantities decrease in comparison to the regime without
RPM.
Proposition 1.7. With discrete money, direct price competition between manufactur-
ers, and perfect price competition between retailers, manufacturers always use minimum
RPM and, in equilibrium, pR > pN and wR < wN .
1.4. Conclusion
In this paper we study the incentives of manufacturers to use RPM when they com-
pete for sales services of common retailers. To induce favorable services by the retailers, a
manufacturer can use minimum RPM to increase the retail margin of its product. Hold-
ing the overall service level constant, we show that in equilibrium the competition of
manufacturers for retail services yields minimum RPM and higher retail prices. In conse-
quence, all consumers – and even manufacturers – can be worse off. Moreover, we show
that RPM is related to market power at the manufacturer level. With RPM, this market
power can translate into high retail prices and excessive retail sales efforts allocated to
these high-priced products. When retailers can invest in the overall level of their match-
ing services, we show that retailers have incentives to invest less when minimum RPM is
used, although retail margins are higher.
Our model features two differentiated manufacturers and two common retailers, en-
dogenous wholesale and retail prices, as well as endogenous service allocations and levels.
As the analysis of such a setting is inherently complicated when all four agents behave
strategically, we have imposed simplifying assumptions. First, we have focused on linear
wholesale tariffs to avoid complications such as the non-existence of an equilibrium, which
has been pointed out by Rey and Vergé (2010). Second, we have assumed that retailers
contribute with their services to a common pool of consumers who are informed about
the prices at both retailers. Although we have indicated that the assumptions can be re-
laxed without qualitatively changing the results, a full fledged analysis under alternative
assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper, but appears promising for future research.
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Service incentives are the major efficiency defense in favor of minimum RPM. In light
of our results, we believe that competition policy relies too much on the established
service arguments with a single manufacturer which – overall – suggest beneficial effects
of minimum RPM. With this paper, we contribute a theory of how minimum RPM can
hurt all consumers – and even manufacturers – in markets where manufacturers compete
for services of common retailers.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. (i.) The FOC for the retail price is given by (1.3.1) and is
independent of w−i and sk. Evaluating the FOC at symmetric retail prices defines the
unique and symmetric equilibrium price pi,1 = pi,2 = p∗i (wi), where uniqueness follows by a
contraction mapping argument (dominant diagonal of the Hessian matrix). To obtain the
pass trough rate, ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
, implicitly differentiate (1.3.1). The regularity assumptions imposed
on di,k imply 0 < ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
< 1.
(ii.) Let ϕ∗i,k(wi) ≡ (p∗i (wi)−wi)di,k(p∗i , p∗i ). To see that
∂ϕ∗i,k
∂wi
< 0, note that the retail
margin decreases in wi as ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
< 1; moreover, di,k decreases in wi because ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
> 0 and
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
< 0 (own price effect dominates).
(iii.) The equilibrium value s∗k is defined by the FOC (1.3.2) evaluated at pi,k = p∗i (wi)
∀ i, k. By symmetry of the retailers, s∗1 = s∗2. Implicit differentiation of (1.3.2) yields
(1.4.1) ∂s
∗
k
∂wi
= − ∂
2Πk
∂sk∂wi
/
∂2Πk
(∂sk)2
= −
∂Mi
∂sk
∂ϕ∗i,k
∂wi
∂2MA
(∂sk)2 ϕ
∗
A,k + ∂
2MB
(∂sk)2 ϕ
∗
B,k
.
∂2Πk
(∂sk)2
< 0 holds as Mi is strictly concave. The sign of ∂s
∗
k
∂wi
thus equals the sign of ∂2Πk
∂sk∂wi
=
∂Mi
∂sk
∂ϕ∗i,k
∂wi
. As shown in part (ii.), ∂ϕ
∗
i,k
∂wi
< 0. From Assumption 1, ∂MA
∂sk
> 0 > ∂MB
∂sk
. Hence,
∂s∗
∂wA
< 0 and ∂s∗
∂wB
> 0. Thus ∂M
∗
i
∂wi
=
[
∂Mi
∂sk
+ ∂Mi
∂s−k
]
∂s∗
∂wi
< 0 as the term in brackets is
positive for i = A and negative for i = B. Equal wholesale prices wA = wB imply
equal retail prices p∗A = p∗B and thus equal profitabilities ϕ∗A,k = ϕ∗B,k ≡ ϕ∗. Hence
s∗ = arg maxsk MA · ϕ∗ + MB · ϕ∗ = arg maxsk MA + MB = 1/2, i.e. service is allocated
evenly. 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Differentiating a manufacturer’s profit pii from (1.3.3)
with respect to wi yields the FOC
M∗i di,k + wiM∗i
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ widi,k
[
∂Mi
∂sk
∂s∗k
∂wi
+ ∂Mi
∂s−k
∂s∗−k
∂wi
]
= 0.(1.4.2)
Evaluating the FOC at wA = wB = wN , and correspondingly pA = pB = pN and s∗k =
1/2∀k, and dividing by Mi yields
(1.4.3) di,k + wN
[(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ di,k
Mi
(∑
k
∂Mi
∂sk
∂s∗k
∂wi
)]
= 0.
Quasi-concavity of pii(wi) implies that the above condition characterizes the equilibrium
wholesale price. Substituting for ∂s
∗
k
∂wi
from (1.4.1) yields
(1.4.4)
di,k + wN
(∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ di,k ·
∂ϕ∗i,k
∂wi
/ϕ∗i,k ·
 −1
2Mi
∑
k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
)2
/
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
 = 0.
Let
(1.4.5) λ ≡ −12Mi
∑
k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
)2
/
(
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
)
.
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Use (1.4.5) and di,k · ∂ϕ
∗
i,k
∂wi
/ϕ∗i,k =
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
(implied by the FOC (1.3.1)) to reduce
(1.4.4) to
(1.4.6) wN
{(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
[
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
]}
+ di,k = 0.
Rearranging (1.4.6) yields (1.3.4). Note that (1.3.6) follows from symmetry in k, i.e., at
s∗ = 1/2, λ = −12Mi
∑
k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
)2
/
(
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
)
= ∂Mi/∂sk
Mi
× ∂Mi/∂sk−∂2Mi/(∂sk)2 . To see that
∂wN
∂λ
< 0,
implicitly differentiate the equilibrium FOC (1.4.6) to obtain
∂wN
∂λ
= −∂
2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂λ
/
∂2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂wi
+
∂2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂w−i
 .
Local stability implies ∂
2pii(wN ,wN)
∂w2i
+ ∂
2pii(wN ,wN)
∂wi∂w−i
< 0. Moreover,
∂2pii
∂wi∂λ
= wN
[
∂di,k(pN , pN)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(p
N , pN)
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
]
< 0
follows from the assumption that the own price effect dominates and 0 < ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
< 1 (Lemma
1.1). Thus ∂wN
∂λ
< 0. The retail profit decreases in wi by Lemma 1.1 and hence increases
in λ. 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. As argued in the text, using RPM is a dominant
strategy for a manufacturer. Given wholesale and retail prices, each retailer chooses
sˆ = arg maxsk Πk. Let ϕi,k(pi, wi) ≡ (pi − wi)di,k(pi, pi). Implicit differentiation of the
FOC ∂Πk/∂sk = 0 yields
(1.4.7) ∂sˆ
∂wi
=
(
∂Mi
∂sk
di,k(pi, pi)
)
/
(
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕi,k +
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕ−i,k
)
,
and, analogously,
(1.4.8) ∂sˆk
∂pi
= −
(
∂Mi
∂sk
∂ϕi,k
∂pi
)
/
(
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕi,k +
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕ−i,k
)
.
A manufacturer solves maxwi,pi pii = wiMi(sk, s−k)
∑
k di,k(pi, pi), taking the prices w−i
and p−i of the other product as given. This yields the FOCs
∂pii
∂wi
= 2 di,kMi + 2widi,k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
∂sˆ
∂wi
)
= 0,(1.4.9)
∂pii
∂pi
= 2wi
[(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
Mi + 2 di,k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
∂sˆ
∂pi
)]
= 0.(1.4.10)
Impose symmetry wR = wA = wB, substitute for ∂sˆ∂wi from (1.4.7) in (1.4.9) and substitute
λ to obtain
∂pii
∂wi
= 2 di,kMi + 2widi,k
(
− di,k(p− w)d λ ∗Mi
)
= 0(1.4.11)
=⇒ wR = p
R
1 + λ.(1.4.12)
Condition (1.4.12) characterizes the relationship between the wholesale price and the
equilibrium retail price pR. To determine pR, substitute for ∂sˆ
∂pi
from (1.4.8) in (1.4.10) to
obtain
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(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
+
(
di,k
(pR − wR) +
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
λ = 0.(1.4.13)
Substitute for wR from (1.4.12) to obtain
pR = di,k−
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
) .(1.4.14)
This is the FOC implied by (1.3.7) which holds if and only if pi = pM . The wholesale
price clearly decreases in λ as pR is independent of λ. For λ→∞, wR → 0 and for λ→ 0,
wR → pM . 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. The condition pN = pM defines a λ such that prices
with and without RPM are equal. Substituting for pN from (1.3.4) and (1.3.5), and for
pM from the FOC implied by (1.3.7), the condition pN = pM becomes
−di,k(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
) + −di,k∂di,k
∂pi,k
= −di,k∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
.
Note that all expressions with di,k are evaluated at prices pM and ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
at
(
pM , wN
)
.
Isolating λ yields
(1.4.15) λ = −∂di,k(p
M , pM)/∂pi,k
∂di,k(pM , pM)/∂pi,−k
− 1 ≡ λM .
To see that λ ≷ λM implies pM ≷ pN , note that pM does not depend on λ, whereas wN
decreases in λ by Proposition 1.1 and ∂pN
∂wN
= ∂p
∗
i (w)
∂w
> 0 by Lemma 1.1. 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Strict concavity of Πk in pi,k (which follows from
weak concavity of di,k) implies that ∂Πk∂pi,k is monotone in pi,k. Thus if
∂Πk
∂pi,k
is negative
(positive) at wi = wR and pi,k = pi,−k = pM , each retailer wants to decrease (increase)
its price and thus RPM is used as minimum (maximum) RPM. Hence minimum RPM is
used if and only if
∂di,k(pM , pM)
∂pi,k
(pM − wR) + di,k(pM , pM) < 0.
Add 0 = ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
pM − ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
pM on the left hand side to obtain
∂di,k
∂pi,k
pM + pM ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
+ di,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 at pM
−wR∂di,k
∂pi,k
− pM ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
< 0.
Substitute wR = pM1+λ (Proposition 1.2) to get λ >
[
−∂di,k(pM ,pM )
∂pi,k
/
∂di,k(pM ,pM )
∂pi,−k
]
− 1 ≡ λM .
For λ = λM , RPM is not needed as pN(wR) = pM ; for λ < λM , maximum RPM is used
in equilibrium. 
.
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Derivation of Example 1.2. Let di,k = 1 − (β + γ) pi,k + γ pi,−k with β, γ > 0.
Hence ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
= γ, ∂di,k
∂pi,k
= −(β + γ), ∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
= −β. p∗i is obtained from substituting
the linear demand expressions into (1.3.2) and letting pi,1 = pi,2 = p. This yields 1 −
β p + γ p + (p − w)(−β) = 0. Solving for p yields p∗i = 1+w (β+γ)2β+γ ,
∂p∗i
∂wi
= β+γ2β+γ , and
d∗i,k = 1 − β 1+w (β+γ)2β+γ . The demand factor Mi is kept in reduced form, yielding the
parameter λ. Equilibrium prices are obtained by plugging the linear-demand analogs
into the reduced form expressions (1.3.7), (1.3.4), (1.3.5), and (1.3.8). This yields wN =
1
2β(1+λ) , p
N = 1+wN (β+γ)2β+γ =
1
2β+γ (1+
β+γ
2β(1+λ)), p
R = pM = 12β , and w
R = pM1+λ =
1
2β (1+λ) .Note
that wN = wR, i.e., the wholesale price does not depend on the pricing regime. As argued
in the text, this condition implies that manufacturer profits with minimum (maximum)
RPM are lower (higher) than without RPM. Retailers benefit from minimum RPM as it
maximizes industry profits and manufacturers lose. Retailers lose when maximum RPM
is used as input prices remain unchanged, but their margins are lower than is individually
optimal for a retailer. 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. If for any given αk the marginal profit ∂Πk∂αk is higher
without than with RPM, then the equilibrium service quality must be strictly higher
without RPM in an interior equilibrium. For l = N,R the marginal profit ∂Πk
∂αk
is generally
given by
(1.4.16)∑
i∈{A,B}
∂M˜i
∂αk
(pl(λ)−wl(λ)) di,k(pl, pl) + M˜i ∂
∂αk
[(pl(λ)− wl(λ)) di,k(pl(λ), pl(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail profitability
]−C ′(αk).
To determine which regime yields higher investment levels, we evaluate the sign of the
difference in marginal profits without and with RPM, i.e. ∂Πk(wN ,pN )
∂αk
− ∂Πk(wR,pR)
∂αk
at
symmetric investments (α1 = α2 = α). Under symmetry, (1.3.10) and (1.3.11) imply
M˜i = 12(3 + α),
∂M˜i
∂αk
|α1=α2=α = 14 , λ = (1−α)2 (3+α) , and ∂λ/∂αk = − 2(3+α)2 . For linear demand,
the retail profitabilities without and with RPM are given by (β+γ)(1+2λ)24(2β+γ)2(1+λ)2 and
λ
4β+4βλ (see
Example 1 and the Proof of Lemma 1.2). The difference in marginal profits reduces to
3β2(3 + α)2 + 3β(3 + α)2γ + 8(1 + α)γ2
128 β(2β + γ)2
and is straightforwardly shown to be positive for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, β > 0 and γ > 0. 
.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. The derivation of wN is analogous to the proof of
Proposition 1.1. Because of perfect price competition, ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
= 1, di,k = di,−k = 1/2di
and p∗i (wi) − wi = ∆. By the implicit function theorem on the FOC to the problem
maxsk 1/2∆Midi we get
(1.4.17) ∂sk
∂wi
= −
∂Mi
∂sk
(
∂di
∂pi
)
+ ∂M−i
∂sk
(
∂d−i
∂pi
)
∂2MA
(∂sk)2 dA +
∂2MB
(∂sk)2 dB
.
Substituting from (1.4.17) in the analogue to (1.4.2) gives us the characterization of wN
in (1.3.12).
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For the equilibrium with RPM, the expressions for ∂sˆ
∂wi
, ∂pii
∂wi
and ∂pii
∂pi
in the proof to
Proposition (1.2) remain analogously valid and ∂sˆk
∂pi
changes analogously to ∂sk
∂pi
above and
is given by
∂sˆk
∂pi
= −
∂Mi
∂sk
(
di,k + (pi − wi) ∂di∂pi
)
+ ∂M−i
∂sk
(
(p−i − w−i) ∂d−i∂pi
)
∂2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕi + ∂
2Mi
(∂sk)2
ϕ−i
.
Using these expressions, wR and pR are derived. Noting that the right hand sides of the
equations are monotonous in the price level under Assumption 4. The comparison of
(1.3.13) and (1.3.12), implies pR > pN . Substituting for pR in the expression for wR, we
obtain
wR =
di
(
pR, pR
)
−
(
∂di(pR,pR)
∂pi
)
(1 + λ) + ∂d−i(pR,pR)
∂pi
λ
<
di
(
pN , pN
)
−∂di(pN ,pN )
∂pi
(1 + λ) + ∂d−i(pN ,pN )
∂pi
λ
= wN
which is true because pR > pN and again each side of the inequality is decreasing mono-
tonically in the retail price level. 
Appendix B: Parametric example
Assume that the total mass of consumers is 4; of them 50% like product A, and
50% product B. Initially, consumers are neither informed about the existence nor the
match value of products A and B, and distribute equally among retailers. Consumers
need a retailers’ advice to learn about products. Once a consumer seeks advice from a
retailer, the retailer receives private information about the consumer’s preferences. This
information is captured by each retailer’s posterior belief q ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds
to the probability that the consumer prefers A and thus not B. We assume that q is
distributed uniformly in the interior. In Subsection 1.3.4, we allow for symmetric retailer
specific mass points of αk/2 at zero and 1. In that case, for each product retailer k knows
for a mass αk of the consumers the type with certainty.
The product presentation boils down to each retailer choosing a threshold probability
sk, such that the retailer presents consumers with product A and for q < sk and with
product B for q > sk.30 The mass of consumers who are correctly matched with product
i by retailer k is thus given by
MA,k = αk + 2
ˆ sk
0
(1− q) (1− αk) dq,(1.4.18)
MB,k = αk + 2
ˆ 1
sk
q (1− αk) dq.(1.4.19)
Note that for αk = 0, the choice sk = 1 implies that the retailer informs all consumers
about product A. Half of these consumers are actually of type A which yields MA,k = 1.
Summing over both retailers and integrating out yields
MA =
∑
k
αk + (1− αk)2
(
sk − s2k/2
)
,
MB =
∑
k
αk + (1− αk)2
(
1/2− s2k/2
)
.
For αk = 0 this corresponds to the parametrization of Example 1.
30There is no reason for a retailer to present product A to a consumer when he has a belief q′ > q and
B to a consumer with q.
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2.1. Introduction
Passive partial ownership across horizontally and vertically related firms is very com-
mon, but has traditionally not been of welfare concern, nor of concern in competition
policy.4 Whereas the anti-competitive effect of horizontal cross-shareholding on prices is
hardly controversial, the effect of vertical ownership arrangements on pricing and foreclo-
sure is much more so.5
By the classic Chicago challenge vertical mergers are competitively neutral at worst
(Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976). Several arguments are around, however, of how vertical
mergers can yield higher consumer prices, or even foreclosure. These rely on particular
assumptions, such as additional commitment power of the integrated firm (Ordover et
al., 1990), secret contract offers (Hart and Tirole, 1990), or costs of switching suppliers
(Chen, 2001).6
Throughout, the authors compare a particular form of integration, namely from com-
plete separation between the raider and the target firm to full joint ownership and control
of the two. Partial ownership, either non-controlling or controlling, is not considered.
Even hindsight suggests, however, that empirically, partial vertical ownership between
related firms is the rule rather than the exception.7 Yet there is very little formal analysis
on the allocation effects of partial interests. This is the focus of our research project.
Before moving on to the specifics reported in this article, we should emphasize a
general point on passive partial interests between vertically related firms. Unlike in the
case of full merger, the identity of the acquiring party matters in partial integration. In
particular, passive forward ownership of an upstream supplier in one of its customers
induces vertical coordination, by reducing double marginalization and thus downstream
prices. We demonstrate this in a companion article (Hunold et al., 2012b). By sharp
contrast, a result of this article is that passive backward ownership induces exactly the
opposite effect, namely horizontal coordination, by exacerbating double marginalization
and increasing downstream prices.
This is our answer to one of the central questions addressed in this article: Is passive
partial backward integration really as innocent as believed heretofore, with respect to
anti-competitive effects such as increasing prices or foreclosure?
Towards this, we focus on passive ownership interests that price setting downstream
firms may hold in their suppliers. Passive ownership involves pure cash flow rights, i.e.
claims on the target’s profits only, without controlling its decisions. We look at the pricing
decisions of firms in a horizontally differentiated downstream market, and in an upstream
homogeneous product market where firms produce at differing levels of marginal costs.
We concentrate on the case of effective upstream competition in which the difference in
4Yet in 2011, Joaquín Almunia, the EU commissioner for competition policy, voiced that there is poten-
tially an enforcement gap, as the EU Merger Regulation does not apply to minority shareholdings. See
“Merger Regulation in the EU after 20 years”, co-presented by the IBA Antitrust Committee and the
European Commission, March 10, 2011.
5See Flath (1991), or more recently Brito et al. (2010) or Karle et al. (2011) for a theoretical analysis of
the profitability of horizontal partial ownership, and Gilo (2000) for examples and an informal discussion
of the antitrust effects.
6Other explanations include input choice specifications (Choi and Yi, 2000), two-part tariffs (Sandonis
and Fauli-Oller, 2006), exclusive dealing contracts (Chen and Riordan, 2007), only integrated upstream
firms (Bourreau et al., 2011) and information leakages (Allain et al., 2010).
7Allen and Phillips (2000), for instance, identify 40 per cent of their sample of alliances, agreements and
joint ventures as related to the exchange of a product or service.
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the marginal costs between the efficient supplier and its competitors restrict that supplier
in its price setting.
Towards our main result, the reasoning is as follows: with an increasing participation
in the profits of that efficient upstream supplier, the acquiring downstream firm softens its
reaction to any upstream price increase. The upstream supplier incorporates this reaction
by increasing its price. Only the effective price charged to the downstream firm cannot
exceed the second efficient firm’s marginal cost. Therefore, the nominal price charged
by the efficient upstream firm can be higher. Thus, upstream competition is relaxed
by passive backward integration. By virtue of the constraint on the efficient upstream
firm’s pricing activity, the two effects, softened reaction of the downstream acquirer, and
increase in the upstream price, perfectly compensate each other.
Yet, as the downstream competitors are naturally served by the same efficient up-
stream firm, the acquirer also incorporates the effect of its own actions on the downstream
competitors’ sales. Its participation in the upstream supplier’s sales to competitors re-
duces its incentive to steal from the competing firms. It thus raises its price above the
price under vertical separation. Strategic complementarity in turn induces all downstream
competitors to increase theirs.
Flath (1989) shows that with successive Cournot oligopolies, constant elasticity de-
mand and symmetric passive ownership, the effects cancel out, so in his model, pure
passive backward integration has no effect. Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) confirm this
invariance result for equilibria involving an upstream monopoly and symmetric down-
stream firms under competition in both, price and quantity. These invariance results
would suggest that there is no need for competition policy to address passive vertical
ownership. By contrast, we show that the invariance property of downstream prices does
not apply within a more general industry structure involving upstream Bertrand compe-
tition with asymmetric costs.
Beyond this central result, we show that as long as competition in both markets is
sufficiently intense, the possibility to raise downstream prices incentivizes downstream
firms to acquire passive interests in the efficient upstream supplier. Yet, in contrast to
what one might expect, partial backward acquisition by a downstream firm does not invite
the input foreclosure of downstream competitors.8 Indeed, via increasing equilibrium
prices, the competitors tend to benefit from the acquiring firm’s decision.
This acquisition, however, takes place short of a level at which the downstream firm
takes control over the upstream target’s pricing decisions. By contrast, if it did, the
upstream firm would lose its power to commit to high transfer prices, and thus all down-
stream prices would decrease. Hence, in the setting analyzed here, backward acquisitions
have an anti-competitive effect only if they are passive.
In the extension section, we show that backward acquisition is more profitable for
the participating firms than full merger, and that all the effects hold even when the
upstream suppliers are allowed to charge two-part tariffs, that in concentrated markets
tend to alleviate the double marginalization problem. In all, we claim that the pricing
consequences of passive backward integration should indeed be of concern to competition
authorities.
The present analysis is related to Chen (2001). He investigates the effects of a full
vertical merger in a similar setting. For such a merger to increase downstream prices,
8See Spiegel (2011) for an analysis of controlling partial vertical ownership and foreclosure.
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the unintegrated downstream rival needs to incur costs of switching between upstream
suppliers. These switching costs allow the integrated firm to charge the downstream
competitor an input price higher than that charged by the next efficient upstream supplier.
We show that for all downstream prices to increase, neither full vertical integration nor
switching costs are necessary, nor does the input price charged to independent downstream
firms need to increase. Indeed, partial backward integration without the transfer of control
rights is effective in raising consumer prices when full integration is not, i.e. when the
Chicago argument about the efficiency increasing effect of vertical mergers does hold. In
consequence, downstream firms have incentives to only acquire profit claims of suppliers
to relax downstream competition.
Separating control from ownership in order to relax competition is the general theme
in the literature on strategic delegation – a term coined by Fershtman et al. (1991). Our
result is most closely related to the earlier example provided by Bonanno and Vickers
(1988), where manufacturers extract retail profits through two-part tariffs, but delegate
the control over retail prices towards inducing a softer price setting of the competitor. In
the present case, strategic delegation involves backward oriented activities. The particular
twist we add to that literature is that the very instrument of share purchases that firms
use to acquire control is used here short of implementing it.
The competition dampening effect identified in the present article relies on internal-
izing rivals’ sales through a common efficient supplier. This relates to Bernheim and
Whinston (1985)’s common agency argument. Strategic complementarity is essential in
the sense that rivals need to respond with price increases to the raider’s incentive to
increase price. Indeed, acquiring passive vertical ownership is a fat cat strategy, in the
terms coined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
A different kind of explanation for backward integration without control is that trans-
ferring residual profit rights can mitigate agency problems, for example when firm specific
investment or financing decisions are taken under incomplete information (Riordan, 1991;
Dasgupta and Tao, 2000). Güth et al. (2007) analyze a model of vertical cross share hold-
ing to reduce informational asymmetries, and provide experimental evidence.9 Whereas
such potentially desirable effects of partial vertical ownership should be taken into account
within competition policy considerations, we abstract from them for expositional clarity.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: We introduce the model in
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we solve and characterize the 3rd stage downstream pricing
subgame. In Section 2.4, we solve for, and characterize the equilibrium upstream prices
arising in Stage 2. We also derive the essential comparative statics with respect to the
downstream firms’ backward interests. In Section 2.5, we analyze a key element involved
in the solution to the first stage of the game, namely the profitability of partial acquisi-
tions. In the Extension Section 2.6, we first compare the results derived in the baseline
model with those derived under full vertical integration. Second, we look at the effects of
bans on upstream price discrimination common to many competition policy prescriptions.
Third and fourth, we consider the effects of relaxing structural assumptions: We replace
sequential by simultaneous pricing decisions, and then allow the upstream firms to charge
observable two-part, rather than linear tariffs. The results remain unchanged. Fifth, we
9Höffler and Kranz (2011a,b) investigate how to restructure former integrated network monopolists. They
find that passive ownership of the upstream bottleneck (legal unbundling) may be optimal in terms of
downstream prices, upstream investment incentives and prevention of foreclosure. A key difference to our
setting is that they keep upstream prices exogenous.
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touch at the case in which upstream competition is ineffective, so that the efficient firm
can exercise complete monopoly power.10 Last, we briefly compare the effects of pas-
sive partial backward integration with those of passive partial horizontal integration. We
conclude with Section 3.7. All proofs are removed to an appendix.
2.2. Model
Two symmetric downstream firms i, i ∈ {A.B} competing in prices pi produce and
sell imperfect substitutes obeying demands qi(pi, p−i), that satisfy
Assumption 5. ∞ > −∂qi(pi,p−i)
∂pi
> ∂qi(pi,p−i)
∂p−i
> 0 (product substitutability).
The production of one unit of downstream output requires one unit of a homogenous
input produced by two suppliers j ∈ {U, V } with marginal costs cj, who again compete
in prices. Assume that cU ≡ 0 and cV ≡ c > 0, so that firm U is more efficient than
firm V , and c quantifies the difference in marginal costs between U and its less efficient
competitor.11 All other production costs are normalized to zero. Upstream suppliers are
free to price discriminate between the downstream firms.
Let xji denote the quantities firm i buys from supplier j, and w
j
i the associated linear
unit price charged to i by supplier j.12 Finally, let δji ∈ [0, 1] denote the ownership share
downstream firm i acquires in upstream firm j. Information is assumed to be perfect.
The game has three stages:
(1) Downstream firms A and B simultaneously acquire ownership shares δji of sup-
pliers.
(2) Suppliers simultaneously set sales prices wji .
(3) Downstream firms simultaneously buy input quantities xji from suppliers, produce
quantities qji , and sell them at prices pi.
Underlying the sequencing is the natural assumption that ownership is less flexible than
prices are, and also observable by industry insiders. This is crucial, as in the following we
employ subgame perfection to analyze how (pure cash flow) ownership affects prices. Yet
the assumption that suppliers can commit to upstream prices before downstream prices
are set is inessential here.
Upstream supplier j’s profit is given by
(2.2.1) pij =
∑
i∈{A,B}
(
wji − cj
)
xji .
Downstream firm i’s profit, including the return from the shares held in upstream firms,
Πi = pi qi(pi, p−i) −
∑
j∈{U,V }
wji x
j
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
operational profit
+
∑
j∈{U,V }
δji pi
j,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream profit shares
(2.2.2)
is to be maximized with respect to its own price pi, subject to the constraint
∑
j x
j
i ≥ qi,
so that input purchases are sufficient to satisfy quantity demanded.
10In our companion article Hunold et al. (2012b), we consider ineffective competition and compare the
effects of passive and controlling partial backward and forward integration.
11The symmetry assumption downstream, and the restriction to two firms downstream and upstream,
respectively, are without loss of generality. One should be able to order the upstream firms by degree of
efficiency, however. Rather than from V , the downstream firms could procur from the world market at
marginal cost c.
12We show in Subsection 2.6.4 that the results extend to observable two part tariffs.
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We use the term partial ownership for an ownership share strictly between zero and
one. We call passive an ownership share that does not involve control over the target
firm’s pricing strategy, and active one that does. The possibility to control the target’s
instruments is treated as independent of the ownership share in the target. With this we
want to avoid the discussion of at which level of shareholdings control arises. That depends
on institutional detail and the distribution of ownership share holdings in the target
firm. Although a restriction of ownership shares to below 1/2 appears highly plausible for
ownership to be passive, our results on passive ownership hold for any partial ownership
share. See O’Brien and Salop (1999), as well as Hunold et al. (2012) for a discussion of
when control arises.
Finally, we define an allocation to involve effective (upstream) competition, if the
efficient upstream firm is constrained in its pricing decision by its upstream competitor,
i.e. can charge effective unit input prices, as perceived by downstream firms, no higher
than c.
An equilibrium in the third, downstream pricing stage is defined by downstream prices
p∗A and p∗B as functions of the upstream prices w
j
i and ownership shares δ
j
i , i ∈ {A, B}; j ∈
{U, V } held by the downstream in the upstream firms, subject to the condition that up-
stream supply satisfies downstream equilibrium quantities demanded. In order to char-
acterize that equilibrium, it is helpful to impose the following conditions on the profit
functions:
Assumption 6. ∂
2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi2
< 0 (concavity),
Assumption 7. ∂
2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂p−i
> 0 (strategic complementarity),
Assumption 8. ∂
2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂p−i
/∂
2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂pi
> ∂
2Π−i(p−i, pi)
∂p−i∂p−i
/∂
2Π−i(p−i, pi)
∂p−i∂pi
(stability).13
An equilibrium in the second, upstream pricing stage specifies prices wj∗i conditional
on ownership shares δji , i ∈ {A, B}; j ∈ {U, V }.
We sometimes wish to obtain closed form solutions for the complete game, by using
the linear demand specification
(2.2.3) qi(pi, p−i) =
1
(1 + γ)
(
1− 1(1− γ) pi +
γ
(1− γ) p−i
)
, 0 < γ < 1,
with γ quantifying the degree of substitutability between the downstream products so
that γ = 0 if the two products are independent, and as γ → 1 the products become
perfect substitutes. With this demand specification, Assumptions 5 to 8 are satisfied.
2.3. Stage 3: Supplier choice and the determination of downstream prices
Downstream firm i’s cost of buying a unit of input from supplier j in which it holds
δji shares is obtained by differentiating the downstream profit (2.2.2) with respect to the
13The stability assumption implies that the best-reply function of i plotted in a (pi, p−i) diagram is flatter
than the best-reply function of −i for any p−i, implying that an intersection of the best reply functions
is unique.
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input quantity xji , i.e.
∂Πi
∂xji
= − wji︸︷︷︸
input price
+ δji
(
wji − cj
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream profit increase
Thus, the unit input price wji faced by downstream firm i is reduced by the contribution
of that purchase to supplier j’s profits. Call −∂Πi
∂xji
the effective input price downstream
firm i is confronted with when purchasing from firm j. The minimal effective input price
for downstream firm i is given by
(2.3.1) wei ≡ min
{
wUi
(
1− δUi
)
, wVi
(
1− δVi
)
+ δVi c
}
.
As natural in this context, firm i buys from the upstream supplier j offering the minimal
effective input price. If both suppliers charge the same effective input price, we assume
that i buys the entire input quantity from the efficient supplier U , as that supplier could
slightly undercut to make its offer strictly preferable. Let j(−i) denote the supplier
j from which the other downstream firm −i buys its input. Differentiating the two
downstream firms’ profits with respect to their own downstream price yields the two first
order conditions
(2.3.2) ∂Πi
∂pi
= (pi − wei )
∂qi
∂pi
+ qi (pi, p−i) + δj(−i)i
(
w
j(−i)
−i − cj(−i)
) ∂q−i
∂pi
= 0,
i ∈ {A, B}.
Observe that whenever δj(−i)i > 0, downstream firm i takes into account that changing its
sales price affects the upstream profits earned via sales quantities q−i to its competitor.14
By Assumptions 1–4, the equilibrium of the downstream pricing game is unique, sta-
ble and fully characterized by the two first order conditions for given input prices and
ownership shares. Note that strategic complementarity holds under the assumption of
product substitutability if margins are non-negative and ∂
2q−i
∂pi ∂p−i
is not too negative (cf.
Equation (2.3.2)). Also observe that if prices are strategic complements at δA = δB = 0,
then strategic complementarity continues to hold for small partial ownership shares.
2.4. Stage 2: Determination of upstream prices under passive ownership
V cannot profitably sell at a (linear) price below its marginal production cost c. U
as the more efficient supplier can profitably undercut V at any positive upstream price.
This implies that, in equilibrium, U supplies both downstream firms, and this at effective
prices at most as high as c.15 To simplify notation, let henceforth δi ≡ δUi and wi ≡ wUi .
Let p∗i (wi, w−i|δA, δB) denote the equilibrium prices of the downstream subgame as a
function of the input prices. Formally, U ′s problem is
max
wA,wB
piU =
∑
i=A,B
wi qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i|δA, δB), p∗−i(w−i, wi|δA, δB)
)
(2.4.1)
subject to the constraints wi (1− δi) ≤ c, i ∈ {A, B} such that downstream firms prefer
to source from U . Differentiating the reduced-form profit in (2.4.1) with respect to wi
14This effect is not present with quantity competition, as then q−i is not a function of the strategic
variable qi.
15This also implies that none of the downstream firms has an interest in obtaining passive shares from
the unprofitable upstream firm V .
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yields
(2.4.2) dpi
U
dwi
= qi(p∗i , p∗−i) + wi
dqi(p∗i , p∗−i)
dwi
+ w−i
dq−i(p∗−i, p∗i )
dwi
.
Starting at wi = w−i = 0, it must be profit increasing for U to marginally increase
upstream prices, because both qi > 0 and q−i > 0. By continuity and boundedness of
the derivatives, this remains true for not too large positive upstream prices. Hence if c
is sufficiently small, then the constraints are strictly binding for any partial ownership
structure, so there is effective upstream competition. In this case, the nominal upstream
equilibrium prices are given by
(2.4.3) w∗i = c/(1− δi),
and the effective upstream prices both equal c. We assume this regime to hold in the core
part of the article.16 In this regime, U ’s profits are uniquely given by
(2.4.4) piU = c(1− δA) qA(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) +
c
(1− δB) qB(p
∗
B, p
∗
A),
and V ’s profits are zero. We summarize in
Lemma 2.1. The efficient upstream firm U supplies both downstream firms at any given
passive partial backward ownership shares (δA, δB). Under effective upstream competition,
i.e. for sufficiently small c, U charges prices w∗i = c/(1 − δi), i ∈ {A, B}, so that the
effective input prices are equal to the marginal cost c of the less efficient supplier V .
With these upstream prices, downstream profits reduce to
Πi = (pi − c) qi + δi c1− δ−i q−i.(2.4.5)
Observe that if firm i holds shares in firm U so that δi > 0, its profit Πi, via its upstream
holding, increases in the quantity demanded of its rival’s product q−i. All else given, this
provides for an incentive to raise the price for its own product. Formally, firm i’s marginal
profit
(2.4.6) ∂Πi
∂pi
= qi + (pi − c) ∂qi
∂pi
+ δi
c
1− δ−i
∂q−i
∂pi
increases in δi. Also, if δi > 0, then the marginal profit of i increases in δ−i, as this
increases the upstream margin earned on the product of −i. If the downstream products
were not substitutable, i.e. ∂q−i
∂pi
= 0, the marginal profit and thus the downstream pricing
would not be affected by backward ownership. As the products (i,−i) become closer
substitutes, ∂q−i
∂pi
increases and the external effect internalized via the cash flow right δi
becomes stronger, and with it the effect on equilibrium prices.
In all, this yields the following central result:
Proposition 2.1. Let Assumptions 1-4 hold and upstream competition be effective.
Then
(i) both equilibrium downstream prices p∗i and p∗−i increase in both δi and δ−i for any
non-controlling ownership structure,
(ii) the increase is stronger when the downstream products are closer substitutes.
16Clearly, if piU (wA, wB) is concave, one, or both of the constraints do not bind for c sufficiently large,
in which case U can charge the unconstrained monopoly price below c. When both constraints do not
bind, we are in the case of ineffective competition analyzed in Hunold et al. (2012b).
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Figure 2.4.1. Best-reply functions of downstream firms A, B and the
vertically integrated unit UA for linear demand as in (2.2.3), with γ = 0.5
and c = 0.5.
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 2.1. Any increase in passive ownership in U by one or both downstream
firms is strictly anti-competitive.
Proposition 2.1 is illustrated in Figure 2.4.1 for the case δA > δB = 0. The solid line
is the inverted best-reply function prB(pA)−1 of B at a given δA > 0. The dashed line is
A′s best reply prA(pB) for δA = 0, and the dashed-dotted line above this is A′s best reply
for δA → 1. Hence, choosing δA amounts to choosing the best-reply function prA(pB) in
the subsequent pricing game. This becomes central when analyzing the profitability of
acquisitions in the next section.
Before going on, we should emphasize that the nominal transfer prices charged here
are higher for the firm with the larger interest in the efficient upstream supplier. This is
interesting because, in view of its potential impact on foreclosure, the competition policy
analyst usually considers dangerous preferentially low transfer prices between vertically
related firms.
2.5. Stage 1: Acquisition of shares by downstream firms
Here we assess the profitability of downstream firms’ backward acquisitions of passive
stakes in upstream firms. We restrict our attention to the acquisition of stakes in firm
U . This is easily justifiable within the context of our model: As both downstream firms
decide to acquire input from the more efficient firm, the less efficient firm V does not earn
positive profits in equilibrium. Hence, there is no scope for downstream firms to acquire
passive interests in V .
Rather than specifying how bargaining for ownership stakes takes place and condition-
ing the outcome on the bargaining process, we determine the central incentive condition
for backward acquisitions to materialize, namely that there are gains from trading claims
to profits in U between that upstream firm and one of the downstream firms. For the sake
of brevity, we abstain from modeling the ownership acquisition game, that would specify
the redistribution of rents to the industry generated from passive backward integration.
In order to enhance the intuition, fix for the moment the stakes held by firm B at
δB = 0. Gains from trading stakes between A and U arise if the joint profit of A and U ,
ΠUA(δA|δB = 0) ≡ p∗A q∗A + c q∗B,
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is higher at some δA ∈ (0, 1) rather than at δA = 0, where p∗A, q∗A and q∗B all are functions
of δA.17 The drastic simplification of this expression results from the fact that a positive
δA just redistributes profits between A and U . The gains from trade between A and U
can thus arise only via indirect effects on prices and quantities induced by increases in
δA. Why should there be such gains from trade at all?
The vertical effects of an increase in δA between A and U are exactly compensating as
the effective transfer price remains at c (Lemma 2.1). All that changes are A’s marginal
profits. They increase in δA, because with this A internalizes an increasing share of U ’s
sales to B. Again, this leads A to increase pA, which in turn induces B to increase pB.
That price increase is not only profitable to B, but eventually yields a net benefit to A
and U . Intuition suggests that this competition softening effect increases the profits of
U and A if competition in the industry is fierce. Indeed, evaluating dΠUA/dδA at small c
yields
Proposition 2.2. An increasing partial passive ownership stake of firm i firm in firm
U increases the combined profits of i and U, if upstream competition is sufficiently intense.
This argument continues to hold if both downstream firms buy shares in the efficient
upstream firm, under the obvious restriction that control is not transferred from U to any
one of the downstream firms.18
Corollary 2.2. Increasing partial passive ownership stakes of firms i and −i in firm
U increase the industry profit ΠUAB ≡ p∗Aq∗A + p∗Bq∗B, if upstream competition is sufficiently
intense.
Using the linear demand example introduced in (2.2.3), we can make explicit how
our case assumption that upstream competition is intense enough relates to the intensity
of downstream competition. Let δ−i = 0. Then the joint profits of firms i and U are
maximized at a positive passive ownership share δi if c < γ2/4. For close to perfect
downstream competition, i.e. γ close to 1, this implies that passive backward ownership
is profitable for a range of marginal costs up to 1/2 of the industry’s downstream monopoly
price.
As a firm’s backward interests confer a positive externality on the second firm’s profits,
the industry profits p∗Aq∗A + p∗Bq∗B are maximized at strictly positive passive ownership
shares by both firms if the less restrictive condition c < γ/2 holds. The fact that γ2/4 <
γ/2 indicates the internalization of the positive externality on the downstream competitor
when interests in the efficient upstream firm are acquired to maximize industry profits.
One might worry about the magnitude of the effect derived; also when many inputs
are procured to produce a unit of the downstream product. Let us start with the base-
line case, in which the downstream products are produced with only one input. Under
the assumed close substitutability between the downstream products, the change in own
demand induced by a price change is of the same order of magnitude as the change in
the competitor’s demand. In equilibrium, the former is weighted by the margin pA − c,
17Passive backward ownership of A in U benefits B as A prices more softly. Our assessment of the
profitability of backward ownership is conservative as this benefit cannot be extracted by U who can at
most charge B a unit price of c. With commitment to exclusive supply from U or two-part tariffs, U can
extract the profit increase of B through a higher marginal price or an up-front fee. See Subsection 2.6.4
for details.
18In Subsection 2.6.1, we consider the effect of a transfer of control, and compare the outcome with the
present one.
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whence the latter is weighed by δA1−δB c. The former can be easily dominated by the latter,
even when the shares held by the downstream firms in the upstream efficient supplier are
small.
Take now a 2 − 1 technology, in which the downstream product is produced by two
inputs. Suppose that input 1 is produced in an industry structured as in the baseline
model, and commodity 2 can be procured at a price of c2. The effective downstream
margin is now given by pA− c− c2, and can be easily dominated by δA1−δB c. What matters
is that the margin of the input on which backward integration takes place is relatively
large when compared to the downstream margin. Note also that if a downstream firm
integrates backward in the efficient supplier of each input, the overall effect is that of
backward integration in case of a 1:1 technology.
In passing, all of these results give rise to interesting hypotheses to be tested em-
pirically. A particularly intricate one is that the externality alluded to here provides
incentives to acquire passive shares in suppliers to competitors. This hypothesis could
provide an explanation for the empirical puzzle demonstrated by Atalay et al. (2012) that
a majority of backward acquisitions is not accompanied by physical product flows. Yet it
still needs to be looked at empirically.
One also might want to speculate about the consequences of the effect derived here
for the entry of firms downstream and upstream. Due to the externality generated on the
outsiders by increasing prices, downstream entry may be invited rather than deterred. By
contrast, upstream, the externality results from the fact that all downstream firms are
supplied by the efficient firm. This tends to constitute an entry barrier.
2.6. Extensions
2.6.1. Effects of control. In this extension, we compare the effects of passive partial
backward integration of one of the downstream firms (say A) into the efficient upstream
firm U , with those generated by a merger between the two firms. We first consider the
merger.
Let the ownership structure under vertical integration be described by {δA = 1, δB =
0}, and let A control U ’s pricing decisions. As U is more efficient than V, the fully
integrated firm continues, as heretofore, to meet any positive price wVB charged by V .
Under effective upstream competition, it is again optimal to set wUB = c. Yet, by virtue
of being merged with U, A takes account of the true input cost normalized to zero.19
Consider now the effect of full integration of A and U on downstream prices. Still
faced with marginal input cost c, B’s best-reply function remains unchanged. Yet full
integration has two countervailing effects on the setting of pA. Upward price pressure
arises because the integrated unit fully internalizes the upstream profit from selling to
firm B, that is c qB(pB, pA). Conversely, downward price pressure arises because double
marginalization on product A is eliminated, as the downstream costs, c qA(pA, pB) under
separation, are decreased to zero. Indeed, downward pressure is stronger when the own
price effect dominates the cross price effect, yielding
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, a vertical merger between one down-
stream firm and U decreases both downstream prices, as compared to complete separation.
19In line with the literature – examples are Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Chen (2001), and Hart and
Tirole (1990) – the integrated firm is considered unable to commit to an internal transfer price higher
than its true marginal cost.
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As another consequence, observe that input foreclosure does not arise under vertical
integration.
Returning to Figure 2.4.1, note that for any δA > 0, the best response of the merged
entity, prUA(pB), represented by the dotted line in Figure 2.4.1, is located below the one
arising under separation.
Proposition 3 is also contained in Chen (2001). Yet for an anti-competitive increase
in downstream prices to occur in that model, Chen needs to assume that B has to make
supplier specific investments to buy from U , so that the integrated firm can set wUB > c and
still continue to be the exclusive supplier of B. By contrast, as we state in Proposition 2.1,
downstream prices increase even without switching costs, once we allow for the separation
of profit claims and control of the target. Summarizing:
Corollary 2.3. Under Assumptions 1 to 4 and effective upstream competition, a
vertical merger between one of the downstream firms and the efficient upstream firm leads
to a decrease of all downstream prices when compared to those arising under vertical
separation, whence any passive partial backward ownership of one or both downstream
firms in the efficient supplier U leads to an increase in all downstream prices.
We now turn to a comparison of the combined profits of A and U under full vertical
separation and full integration. By Proposition 2.3, vertical integration decreases both
downstream prices. This is not necessarily desirable for A and U , as long as the overall
margins earned under vertical separation are below the industry profit maximizing level.
In order to assess whether separation increases the combined profits ΠUA, we ask whether,
at vertical separation, it is profitable to move towards integration. Indeed, we can show
that this is strictly unprofitable, as long as c is sufficiently small. By continuity, there
exists an interval (0, c¯] such that for any c in this interval vertical separation is more
profitable than integration. Hence
Lemma 2.2. A merger between A and U is less profitable than complete vertical sep-
aration if upstream competition is sufficiently intense.
Combining Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.2 yields
Corollary 2.4. Passive partial backward integration of firm i into firm U is more
profitable than vertical integration, if upstream competition is sufficiently intense. Then,
downstream firms have the incentive to acquire maximal backward interests, short of con-
trolling the upstream firm U.
As mentioned before, this result is nicely related to the literature on strategic dele-
gation. The particular twist here is that the very instrument intended to acquire control,
namely the acquisition of equity in the target firm, is employed short of controlling the
target. This benefits the industry, but it harms consumer welfare.
A remark on control with partial ownership. The key driver behind Corrollary 2.4
is that passive ownership preserves double marginalization, whereas a vertical merger
eliminates it. It is common in the literature on vertical relations to assume that a merged
entity cannot commit to internal transfer prices above marginal costs (see footnote 19).
This assumption is arguably less straightforward with controlling partial ownership,
say when A has a block of voting shares of U . If downstream competition is sufficiently
strong, the shareholders of A and U collectively have an incentive to commit to a high
transfer price wA. However, A has an individual incentive to be charged a low price, or
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at least wants to be compensated with a fixed payment. If A cannot be compensated or
commitment to a high price is not feasible as renegotiations remain possible, A will use
its control to decrease wA, its own input costs. In a standard bargaining framework, the
price wA decreases more, the more control A has over U , whereas the price for B remains
unchanged as there is no conflict of interest over it among the shareholders of U .
2.6.2. Non-discriminatory upstream prices. Many competition laws require a
firm to charge non-discriminatory prices. While by the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, non-
discrimination is a widely applied rule, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union restricts the application of the rule to dominant firms.
Clearly, under effective competition, symmetric passive ownership with δA = δB > 0
may arise as an equilibrium. Supplier U then has no incentive to price discriminate.
Yet, as we have shown in Proposition 2.1, symmetric passive ownership is clearly anti-
competitive, so in this case, a non-discrimination rule has no effect at all, and in particular
no pro-competitive effect.
Consider instead one of the firms’, say A’s, incentive to acquire a backward interest in
firm U when non-discrimination is effective and δB = 0. Then U must charge a uniform
price c if it wants to serve both downstream firms. This yields profits to A of
ΠA = (pA − c) · qA + δA c · (qA + qB) .
Differentiating with respect to pA and δA yields
∂2ΠA
∂pA∂δA
= c ·
[
∂qA(pA, pB)
∂pA
+ ∂qB(pB, pA)
∂pA
]
.(2.6.1)
By Assumption 5, the own price effect dominates the cross price effect, and therefore the
cross derivative in (2.6.1) is negative at δA = 0. Thus marginally increasing δA decreases
the marginal profit of A. Hence, the best reply prA(pB|δA) and, in consequence, both
equilibrium downstream prices, decrease in δA at δA = 0. By continuity, this holds for
small positive δA. This result generalizes to all feasible δA as long as ∂qB∂pA ≤
∂qA
∂pB
for
pA < pB, e.g. in case of linear demand. Under this condition, if only one downstream
firm has passive ownership in U , and U optimally serves both downstream firms, then
such ownership is not anti-competitive under a non-discrimination rule.20
2.6.3. Simultaneous price setting. So far, we have assumed that upstream prices
are set before downstream prices. Consider now that all prices are set simultaneously. In
this situation, upstream firms take downstream prices as given. For U , increasing effective
prices up to c does not affect quantity. Hence, effective equilibrium upstream prices must
be equal to c. However, with simultaneous price setting, an equilibrium does only exist
as long as the participation constraints of downstream firms are not violated at effective
upstream prices of c.
Lemma 2.3. Under effective competition, sequential and simultaneous setting of up-
and downstream prices are outcome equivalent.
20U wants to serve both downstream firms for a small δi, given δ−i = 0. Once δi becomes large, U may
find it profitable to set a high nominal price at which only i wants to purchase. This makes −i dependent
on V . In turn, V can raise the price charged to −i above c, yielding partial foreclosure. However, it is
unclear whether partial foreclosure is an equilibrium. In a forthcoming article, we will discuss in detail
the effects of non-discrimination rules in the different case situations.
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Note that as long as the participation constraints of downstream firms do not bind,
the simultaneous price setting is equivalent to the case in which downstream prices are
set first, followed by upstream prices and, finally, downstream firms choose where to buy
inputs.
2.6.4. Two-part tariffs. The assumption of linear upstream prices is clearly restric-
tive, as argued already in Tirole (1988). Caprice (2006) as well as Sandonis and Fauli-Oller
(2006) have pointed out that with effective upstream competition, observable two part
tariffs offered by the efficient supplier U implement downstream prices below the industry
profit maximizers. One reason is that U does not want to offer marginal input prices as
high so that they maximize industry profits, because downstream firm i′s alternative to
sourcing from U , given its rival −i sources from U , is more valuable when U charges −i
a higher marginal price. This induces U to lower the marginal prices below the industry
profit maximizing level, in order to obtain more rents through the fixed fees.
Moreover, if U cannot offer exclusive contracts, a downstream firm will source inputs
alternatively once the marginal input price charged by U exceeds the alternative input
price. In our setting, this implies that without backward interests by a downstream firm,
U cannot implement a marginal price above c to that firm. We show that in the case
discussed heretofore, U indeed would like to offer marginal prices above c. Thus marginal
input prices in equilibrium equal c and the fixed fee F equals zero, i.e. the transfer prices
U charges are endogenously linear.
In what follows, we formally characterize the two-part contracting problem and show
that passive backward ownership can increase downstream prices.
We start from complete vertical separation, so that δA = δB = 0, and maintain the
assumptions that all contract offers are observable to all downstream firms upon accep-
tance; in particular that acceptance decisions are observed when downstream prices are
set. A tariff offered by supplier j to downstream firm i is summarized by {F ji , wji },
where F ji is the fixed fee downstream firm i has to pay the upstream firm j upon ac-
ceptance of the contract, and wji continues to be the marginal input price. Denote by
pi∗i (w
j
i , w
k
−i), j, k ∈ {U, V } , firm i’s reduced form downstream profits at downstream equi-
librium prices as a function of the marginal input price relevant for each downstream
firm, but gross of any fixed payment. With the model constructed as in the main part
of the article, the Bertrand logic still holds: U can always profitably undercut any (un-
dominated) offer by V , so in equilibrium U exclusively supplies both downstream firms.
Yet if upstream competition is effective as assumed throughout, U is restricted by V in
its price setting. We require that V ’s offers, if accepted, yield it non-negative profits.
More formally, for given contract offers of V to firm A and B, U ’s problem is
max
fUA ,f
U
B ,w
U
A ,w
U
B
piU =
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
wUi qi + FUi
]
s.t. pi∗i
(
wUi , w
U
−i
)
− FUi ≥ pi∗i
(
wVi , w
U
−i
)
− F Vi .(2.6.2)
U has to ensure that each downstream firm’s deviation to source from V is not profitable.
In equilibrium, the profit constraints of both downstream firms must be binding, as oth-
erwise U could profitably raise the respective fixed fee FUi , until downstream firm i is
indifferent between its and V ’s contract offer.
Let the contracts offered by upstream firms first be non-exclusive, so that an upstream
firm cannot contractually require a downstream firm to exclusively procure from it. Then,
2.6. EXTENSIONS 44
setting a marginal input price wUi > c with FUi < 0 cannot be an equilibrium, as V could
profitably offer {F Vi = 0, wVi ∈ [c, wUi )}, which would provide incentives to downstream
firm i to accept U ’s contract offer in order to cash in FUi , but to source its entire input
at the marginal cost wVi offered by V .
The equilibrium contract offers made by V must be best replies to U ’s equilibrium
contract offers. Hence
Lemma 2.4. If U offers two-part tariffs with wUi ≤ c, i ∈ {A,B}, then {0, c} is V ’s
unique non-exclusive counteroffer that maximizes the downstream firms’ profits and yields
V a non-negative profit.
Using this insight and letting wi ≡ wUi and Fi ≡ FUi to simplify notation, U ′s problem
reduces to
max
wA,wB
piU =
∑
i∈{A,B}
p∗i (wi, w−i) q∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry profit
− ∑
i∈{A,B}
pi∗i (c, w−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
outside options
(2.6.3)
subject to the no-arbitrage constraints wi ≤ c, i ∈ {A,B}.
For c =∞, the outside options equal 0, and U simply maximizes the industry profit by
choosing appropriate marginal input prices. As c decreases, sourcing from V eventually
yields downstream firms positive profits. Moreover, firm i’s outside option, the profit
pi∗i (c, w−i) it would obtain when sourcing from V , increases in the rival’s cost w−i. Hence
the marginal profit ∂piU/∂wi is below the marginal industry profit. For c sufficiently small,
the marginal industry profit is still positive when the arbitrage constraints are binding,
i.e. at wA = wB = c. Hence the motive of devaluing the contract partners’ outside options
is dominated by the incentive to increase double marginalization, yielding the result that
upstream tariffs are endogenously linear. We summarize in
Proposition 2.4. Let upstream competition be sufficiently intense. Then under ver-
tical separation, {c, 0} is the unique symmetric equilibrium non-exclusive two-part tariff
offered by both upstream to both downstream firms.
As before, sufficient intensity of upstream competition is to be seen relative to the
intensity of downstream competition. In our linear demand example, it suffices to have
c < γ2/4. In passing, this is also the condition ensuring the profitability of an initial
increase of passive backward ownership δi to i and U .
What does change if we allow for passive partial backward integration? As {0, c} is a
corner solution, (at least some) passive backward ownership does not change the efficient
upstream firm’s incentive to charge maximal marginal prices.
Moreover, recall that passive backward ownership of i in U exerts a positive externality
on −i as i prices more softly, but only if −i sources from U . With two-part tariffs, U can
extract the upward jump in −i’s payoffs by charging a positive fixed fee.21 Assuming that
commitment to only buy from U is not feasible, we obtain
Lemma 2.5. Let upstream competition be sufficiently intense and δi > δ−i = 0. The
non-exclusive two-part tariff offered by U to i has wi = c/(1 − δi) and Fi = 0, and the
tariff to −i has w−i = c and F−i > 0.
21U could also charge B marginal price above c, but only if commitment to exclusive dealing of B with
U is possible. To remain consistent with the main part, we rule this out here, as does Chen (2001).
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Thus, when firm i has acquired a positive share, the effective input price U charges it
remains at c as under linear tariffs. With non-exclusivity, a higher marginal input price is
not feasible, as then firm i would buy the inputs from V , that continues to charge {0, c}.
Hence Proposition 2.2 still applies and we obtain
Corollary 2.5. Let upstream competition be sufficiently intense. Then partial pas-
sive ownership of downstream firm i in supplier U increases bilateral profits ΠUi as well
as industry profits ΠUAB compared to complete separation, even if non-exclusive two-part
tariffs are allowed for.
Hence the results derived in the main part of the article for linear tariffs are upheld
with non-exclusive observable two-part tariffs, if competition is sufficiently intense. When
upstream competition is less intense, it is optimal for U to charge effective marginal prices
below c to reduce the downstream firms’ outside options. Thus the no-arbitrage constraint
wi ≤ c/(1−δi) is no longer binding, which is also the case when U offers exclusive two-part
tariffs. Yet passive backward integration still relaxes downstream competition for given
effective input prices. Moreover, U can still extract the positive externality of backward
ownership on downstream competitors by raising either the fixed fee or the marginal price.
Assuming that demand is linear and V offers {0, c}, one can show that passive backward
ownership is indeed both profitable and increases downstream prices for large parameter
ranges of c and γ where contracts with effective marginal input prices above or below c
result.22
2.6.5. Ineffective competition. In the baseline model, we have analyzed the effects
of passive partial backward integration when there is effective upstream competition, as
generated by a small difference c in marginal costs between the efficient firm U and the
less efficient firm V , such that U was constrained in its pricing. We now sketch the case
that the cost difference c is so large that U can behave as an unconstrained upstream
monopolist.
Consider first complete vertical separation. With linear upstream prices, the well
known double marginalization problem arises, so that the equilibrium downstream prices
are above the level that maximizes industry profits, and approach the industry profit
maximizing prices from above only as downstream competition tends to become perfect.
For the industry, it is not desirable to further relax competition. Instead, it is desirable
to reduce margins with, for example, resale price maintenance, passive forward integra-
tion, or observable two-part tariffs. With observable two-part tariffs, U can maximize
the industry profits by choosing the marginal price in accordance to downstream compe-
tition and extracting all downstream profits through fixed fees. Hence the owners of U
have no interest in backward ownership because the profits they can extract are already
maximized.
The case with linear tariffs is less straightforward. As before, for given marginal input
prices wA and wB, an increase in the passive backward ownership share δA in the supplier
reduces A’s effective input price, so that A has an incentive to lower its sales price. Yet
a positive δA also induces A to internalize its rivals’ sales, so that A wants to increase
its sales price. The first effect tends to dominate, so that downstream prices decrease in
22If V can also offer exclusive contracts, the analysis is more complicated. We simplify here to increase
expositional clarity.
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δA for given (nominal) input prices. As U is unconstrained, it can adjust wA and wB in
response to any ownership change until its marginal profits are zero again. Hence, both
effects of an increase in δA on downstream prices are internalized by the unconstrained
upstream monopolist. This gives rise to invariant downstream prices in case of symmetric
backward ownership.23
By contrast, with effective upstream competition in our model, only the first, marginal
cost decreasing effect of an increase in δA is counterbalanced by the efficient upstream firm
U , and that perfectly. Hence the overall effect equals the second effect of internalizing the
rivals’ sales, and thus both downstream prices increase in δA.
2.6.6. Comparing passive backward with passive horizontal integration. We
have shown that passive backward integration of downstream firms, rather than invit-
ing foreclosure, induces downstream horizontal coordination, leading to increasing down-
stream prices. One might be tempted to ask how this price change compares to that
induced by direct passive horizontal integration. Let us compare the profits of the inte-
grating downstream firm, say A, under the two forms of integration, with the same block
share δA > 0, and let δB = 0. Under backward integration as heretofore, they are, at
competitive upstream prices, given by
ΠA = (pA − c) qA + δA c qB,(2.6.4)
whence under horizontal integration, they are given by
ΠA = (pA − c) qA + δA (pB − c) qB.(2.6.5)
By a first order argument, A internalizes the sales of B more under backward integration if
c > pB−c, i.e. if the upstream margin of product B is larger than its downstream margin.
With linear demand and effective upstream competition, passive backward integration
yields a higher price level than passive horizontal integration if c > g(γ), where g is a
decreasing function.24 For a given upstream margin c, passive backward integration is
more anti-competitive if downstream products are sufficiently close substitutes (g → 0 as
γ → 1).
2.7. Conclusion
In this article, we consider vertically related markets with differentiated, price setting
downstream firms, that produce with inputs from upstream firms supplying a homoge-
neous product at differing marginal costs. We analyze the impact on equilibrium prices of
one or more downstream firms holding passive, that is non-controlling ownership shares
in the efficient, and therefore common, supplier. In sharp contrast to earlier studies who
focused either on Cournot competition or upstream monopoly, we find that if competition
is sufficiently intense, passive ownership leads to increased downstream prices and thus is
strictly anti-competitive. Also, passive ownership is anti-competitive where a full vertical
merger would be pro-competitive.
23For linear upstream tariffs and symmetric passive backward ownership in the monopoly supplier, Green-
lee and Raskovich (2006) show that upstream and downstream price adjustments exactly compensate, so
downstream prices stay the same independent of the magnitude of partial ownership and the intensity
of downstream competition. In Hunold et al. (2012b), we show that for linear demand, linear prices
and upstream price discrimination, there is no incentive to acquire passive backward ownership in the
monopoly supplier; moreover, consumer surplus increases with asymmetric backward ownership.
24In fact, g(γ) = 2−γ−γ
2
6−γ−γ2(2+δA) .
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Confronted with the choice between passive backward integration and a full vertical
merger, the firms prefer the former. They voluntarily abstain from controlling the up-
stream firm, because this would do away with its power to commit to a high transfer price,
that increases industry profit. The very instrument typically employed to obtain control
is used up to the point where control is not attained. This brings an additional feature to
the strategic delegation literature.
Our result is driven primarily by a realistic assumption on the upstream market struc-
ture, in which an efficient supplier faces less efficient competitors, allowing it to increase
upstream prices only when the price increasing effect is absorbed by the downstream
firm(s), via their claims on upstream cash flows. We show the result to be robust to
changes in other assumptions such as linear upstream prices, and sequential price setting
upstream and then downstream. Indeed, once allowing upstream firms to offer observable
two-part tariffs, we find that the equilibrium contracts are endogenously linear if compe-
tition is sufficiently intense. Interestingly enough, under effective upstream competition,
passive ownership in suppliers tends not to be anti-competitive under a non-discrimination
clause.
For competition policy, it is important to recognize that anti-competitive passive own-
ership in common suppliers is profitable when there is both up- and downstream competi-
tion and thus foreclosure potentially not the main concern. Most importantly, proposing
passive backward ownership in a supplier as a remedy to a proposed vertical merger tends
not to benefit competition but eventually worsens the competitive outcome, as long as
upstream competition is effective and the upstream supplier serves competitors of the
raider. The reason is that full vertical integration tends to remove double marginalization
via joint control, whilst partial backward integration tends to enhance that.
In the present setting, we abstract from other, potentially socially desirable motives for
partial backward ownership. A particularly important effect is the mitigation of agency
problems in case of firm-specific investments (Riordan, 1991; Dasgupta and Tao, 2000)
such as investment in specific R&D. Indeed, Allen and Phillips (2000) show for a sample
of US companies that vertical partial ownership is positively correlated with a high R&D
intensity. Yet such potentially pro-competitive effects need to be weighed against the
anti-competitive effects of passive backward integration presented here.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose for the moment that only downstream firm
i holds shares in U , i.e. δi > δ−i = 0. The first order condition ∂Π−i∂p−i = 0 implied by (2.4.6)
and, hence, the best-reply pr−i(pi) of −i is independent of δi. In contrast, the marginal
profit ∂Πi
∂pi
increases in i′s ownership share δi for δ−i ∈ [0, 1). This implies a higher best
reply pri (p−i|δi) for any given p−i. By continuity, ∂p
r
i (p−i|δi)
∂δi
> 0. Strategic complementarity
of downstream prices implies that an increase in δi increases both equilibrium prices. This
argument straightforwardly extends to the case where both firms hold shares in U because
then ∂2Πi
∂pi∂δ−i
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Differentiating the combined profits of A and U with
respect to δA and using that δB = 0 yields
dΠUA
dδA
=
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ qA + c
∂qB
∂pA
)
dp∗A
dδA
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
dp∗B
dδA
.(2.7.1)
Clearly, at c = 0, the derivative is equal to zero as dp∗i /dδA = 0 as the upstream margin is
zero. To assess the derivative for small, but positive c, further differentiate with respect
to c to obtain
d2ΠUA
dδAdc
= d
d c
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ q∗A + c ∂qB∂pA
)
dp∗A
dδA
+ d
d c
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
dp∗B
dδA
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ qA + c ∂qB∂pA
)
d2p∗A
dδAdc
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
d2p∗B
dδAdc
.
Evaluating this derivative at c = 0 yields
d2ΠUA
dδAdc
|c=0 = p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
d2p∗B
dδAdc
|c=0,
because dp
∗
A
dδA
|c=0 = dp
∗
B
dδA
|c=0 = 0 and pA ∂qA∂pA + qA = 0 (this is the FOC of piA with respect
to pA at c = 0). Recall that dp
∗
B
dδA
> 0 for c > 0 (Proposition 2.1) whereas dp
∗
B
dδA
= 0 at
c = 0. By continuity, this implies d
2p∗B
dδA dc
|c=0 > 0. It follows that d
2ΠUA
dδAdc
|c=0 > 0 which, by
continuity, establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The best response function of A under complete sep-
aration is characterized by
(2.7.2) ∂ΠA
∂pA
= (pA − c) ∂qA
∂pA
+ qA = 0.
rices of c. When maximizing the integrated profit pAqA + wBqB, it is – as argued before
– still optimal to serve B at wB ≤ c and, hence, the corresponding downstream price
reaction is characterized by
(2.7.3) pA
∂qA
∂pA
+ qA + wB
∂qB
∂pA
= 0.
Subtract the left hand side (lhs) of (2.7.2) from the lhs of (2.7.3) to obtain ∆ ≡ c ∂qA
∂pA
+
wB
∂qB
∂pA
. The symmetric fixed point under separation (δA = δB = 0 and no shift in price
control) has pA = pB. This implies ∂qB∂pA =
∂qA
∂pB
. Hence, at equal prices, ∆ is negative as
− ∂qA
∂pA
> ∂qA
∂pB
> 0 by Assumption 5 and wB ≤ c. A negative ∆ implies that the marginal
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profit of A under integration is lower and thus the integrated A wants to set a lower pA.
The best-reply function of B is characterized by
(2.7.4) ∂ΠB
∂pB
= (pB − y) ∂qB
∂pB
+ qB(pB, pA) = 0
with y = c under separation and y = wB ≤ c under integration of A and U . Hence
the best reply function prB(pA) of B is (weakly) lower under integration. Taken together,
strategic complementarity and stability (Assumptions 7 and 8) implies that the unique
fixed point of the downstream prices under integration must lie strictly below that under
separation. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2. We look at the joint profit ΠUA of A and U when we move
from vertical separation to vertical integration. Recall that under effective competition,
the upstream firm, integrated or not, will always set the maximal input price w∗B = c
when selling to firm B, and this independently of any choice of wA. Also recall that
ΠUA = p∗A qA(p∗A, p∗B) + c qB(p∗B, p∗A). Let the equilibrium downstream prices as a function
of input prices be given by p∗A(wA, c) ≡ arg maxpA pA qA(pA, p∗B) + cqB −wA [qA + qB] and
p∗B(c, wA) ≡ arg maxpB (pB−c) qB(pB, p∗A). Note that wA = 0 yields the downstream prices
under integration, and wA = c those under separation.
The effect of an increase of wA on ΠUA is determined by implicit differentiation. This
yields
dΠU∗A
dwA
= dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗A
dp∗A
dwA
+ dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗B
dp∗B
dwA
.
First, Assumptions 1-4 imply that at wA = c and hence p∗A = p∗B, we have both
dp∗A
dwA
> 0
and dp
∗
B
dwA
> 0 for c ≥ 0. Second,
dΠU∗A
dp∗A
= qA(p∗A, p∗B) + (p∗A − c)
∂qA
∂pA︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+c
[
∂qA
∂pA
+ ∂qB
∂pA
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 at pA=pB
< 0,
but approaches 0 as c goes to zero. Third, dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗B
= p∗A ∂qA∂pB + c
∂qB
∂pB
is strictly positive for c
sufficiently close to zero. In consequence,
[
dΠU∗A
dp∗B
dp∗B
dwA
]
wA=c
> 0 dominates
[
dΠU∗A
dp∗A
dp∗A
dwA
]
wA=c
<
0 as c goes to zero. Summarizing, dΠ
U∗
A
dwA
|wA=c > 0 for c sufficiently small. By continuity,
decreasing wA from c to 0 decreases ΠU∗A for c sufficiently small which implies that moving
from separation to integration is strictly unprofitable. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Suppose that firm −i sources only from U . The most at-
tractive contract that V can offer i must yield V zero profits, i.e. F Vi = xVi · (c − wVi ),
with xVi denoting the quantity i sources from V . Given wUi ≤ c , the arbitrage possibility
due to multiple sourcing renders contracts with wVi > c and thus F Vi < 0 unprofitable as
xVi would be 0. Recall that p∗i (wi, w−i) denotes the downstream equilibrium price of i as
a function of the marginal input prices. The net profit of i when buying all inputs from
V is given by
Πi = (p∗i (wVi , wU−i)− wVi ) qi(p∗i (wVi , wU−i), p∗−i(wU−i, wVi ))− F Vi .
Substituting for F Vi using the zero profit condition of V with xVi = qi yields
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Πi = (p∗i (wVi , wU−i)− c) qi(p∗i (wVi , wU−i), p∗−i(wU−i, wVi ).
Increasing wVi at wVi = c is profitable if dΠi/dwVi |wVi =c > 0. Differentiation yields
dΠi/dwVi =
dΠi
dp∗i
dp∗i
dwVi
+ dΠi
dp∗−i
dp∗−i
dwVi
.
Optimality of the downstream prices implies dΠi
dp∗i
= 0. Moreover, dp
∗
−i
dwVi
> 0 follows from
the strategic complementarity of downstream prices, and with it, the supermodularity
of the downstream pricing subgame. Finally, dpii
dp∗−i
> 0 follows directly from ∂qi
∂p−i
> 0
(substitutable products). Combining these statements yields
dΠi
dwVi
|wVi =c =
dΠi
dp∗−i
dp∗−i
dwVi
> 0.
This implies that raising wVi above c would be profitable for i. However, the no arbitrage
condition and wUi ≤ c renders this impossible. Analogously, decreasing wVi below c and
adjusting F Vi to satisfy zero profits of V is not profitable for i. In consequence, the
contract offer of V most attractive to any downstream firm i is given by {0, c}. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Recall that for marginal input prices of wi and w−i,
i′s equilibrium downstream price is given by p∗i (wi, w−i). Also recall that
pi∗i (wi, w−i) ≡ [p∗i (wi, w−i)− wi] qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, wi)
)
and substitute for pi∗i (c, w−i) in (2.6.3) to obtain
piU =
∑
i
p∗i (wi, w−i) qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, wi)
)
−∑
i
(p∗i (c, w−i)− c) qi
(
p∗i (c, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, c)
)
.
The first sum captures the industry profits and the second, as {0, c} is V ’s tariff that
maximizes the downstream firms’ profits (Lemma 2.4), the value of each of the downstream
firms’ outside option. An obvious candidate equilibrium tariff of U is {F ∗ = c, w∗ = 0}
to both downstream firms. This results in piU = 2c qi(p∗(c, c), p∗(c, c)). Let {F ∗, w∗}
denote alternative symmetric equilibrium candidates offered by U . Recall that w∗ > c
with F ∗ < 0 is not feasible, as then the downstream firms would source all quantities from
V . Towards assessing whether U would benefit from lowering w below c (and increasing
F ), we differentiate piU with respect to w at and evaluate it at w = c. If that sign is
positive for wi, i ∈ {A,B} separately and jointly, then U has no incentive to decrease its
price below c. Differentiation of piU with respect to wi yields
(2.7.5)
dpiU
dwi
= ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
qi + p∗i
(
∂qi
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
)
+ ∂p
∗
−i
∂wi
q−i + p∗−i
(
∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
)
− ∂p
∗
−i
∂wi
q−i −
(
p∗−i − c
)(∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
)
.
Evaluating the derivative at wi = w−i = c, subtracting and adding c ∂qi∂pi
(
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂p
∗
−i
∂wi
)
,
making use of downstream firm i’s FOC ∂pii
∂pi
= (p∗i − c) ∂qi∂pi + qi = 0 and simplifying, we
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obtain
(2.7.6) dpi
U
dwi
= c
(
∂qi
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
)
+ (p∗i − c)
∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
.
Substituting for p∗i − c = −qi/ ∂qi∂pi from the FOC ∂pii∂pi = 0 yields that dpi
U
dwi
> 0 iff
(2.7.7) c < qi−
(
∂qi
∂pi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
) · ∂qi∂p−i− ∂qi
∂pi
·
∂p∗i
∂w−i
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂p
∗
i
∂w−i
.
The rhs of (2.7.7) remains positive as c goes to zero. Hence (2.7.7) holds for c sufficiently
small. This establishes the result. 
Proof of Lemma 2.5. With passive backward ownership δA > δB = 0, the impor-
tant distinction is that when B buys from V , A does not internalize the sales of B. Again,
given that V charges {0, c}, U sets the downstream firms indifferent with fees of
FA = ΠA(U)(wA, wB)− ΠA(V )(c, wB),
FB = ΠB(U)(wB, wA)− ΠB(V )(c, wA),
where Πδi(j),Πi(j) are the reduced form total downstream profits of i when sourcing from j
as a function of nominal marginal input prices. Substituting the fees in the profit function
of U yields
piU =
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
p∗i qi
(
p∗i , p
∗
−i
)]
− ΠA(V )(c, wB)− ΠB(V )(c, wA).(2.7.8)
As before, the profit consists of the industry profit piI ≡ ∑i p∗i qi less the off-equilibrium
outside options. The optimal marginal input prices are characterized by
∂piU/∂wA = ∂piI/∂wA − ∂ΠB(c, wA)/∂wA,
∂piU/∂wB = ∂piI/∂wB − ∂ΠA(c, wB)/∂wB.
For wB = c and wA = c/(1− δA), the derivatives converge to (2.7.6), used in the Proof of
Proposition 2.4, when δA → 0. Thus the derivatives are still positive when δA increases
marginally at 0. By continuity, the corner solutions are sustained for small backward inte-
gration shares and c sufficiently small. Moreover, FA = ΠA(U)(c/(1−δA), c)−ΠA(V )(c, c) =
0 and FB = ΠB(U)(c, c/(1− δA))−ΠB(V )(c, c/(1− δA)) > 0 as A prices more aggressively
when B sources from V , because then A does internalize sales via the profit part δAwBqB.
This logic extends to the case that also δB increases at 0. 
KAPITEL 3
The design of cartel damage compensations
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Abstract. Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase
deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead
have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion
to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of
downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase
consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation.
These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach
towards private enforcement of competition law.
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3.1. Introduction
It is common in the US that private agents sue infringers of competition law for damage
compensation. In particular, buyers of cartelists typically claim treble the overcharge for
each unit bought. Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) have pointed out that this Overcharge
Compensation (OCC) may not be effective if the compensation payment is anticipated by
cartelists and buyers when trading. The reason is that the OCC constitutes a discount
paid by cartelists to buyers, which is perfectly compensated by an increase in the cartel
price. Hence, expected prices as well as profits of cartelists and buyers are not affected
by the presence of private enforcement.2 Baker suggests that an efficient compensation
should rather be proportional to actual losses.3 Indeed, compensating in proportion to
actual losses is in line with results about efficient deterrence (Landes, 1983) and a common
principle in civil law. The actual loss of a downstream firm due to an upstream cartel
equals the difference in downstream equilibrium profits as a result of different upstream
prices. This encompasses pass-on of increased input prices, adjustments in quantities as
well as competitive reactions, whereas the OCC is simply a multiple of the actual quantity
purchased from a cartelist times the cartel price overcharge.
In this paper, I show that compensating for actual losses (Lost Profit Compensation,
LPC) can instead have adverse effects on cartel profits, allocative efficiency, and effective
compensation. In other words, I demonstrate that in cases where the OCC has at worst
no effect, the LPC actually increases the undesired effects of an infringement. This result
is obtained for typical industry structures with up- and downstream competition where
contracting with externalities occurs (Segal, 1999). The LPC rule enables firms to write
supply contracts that increase industry profits to the benefit of cartelists, when compared
to no compensation rule.
This research relates to the ongoing policy debate in Europe. The European Court
of Justice stated in Courage (2001) and Manfredi (2006) that everybody can claim com-
pensation for the damages actually incurred due to competition law infringements – this
is what I call Lost Profit Compensation.4 Backed by these decisions, the European Com-
mission (2005, 2008) has expressed its intention to facilitate private enforcement. The
Commission aims at improving deterrence, efficiency, and corrective justice by enabling
compensation of those who suffered losses. It has stressed that it aims at full compen-
sation, taking into account lost profits and not only the overcharge that customers of
cartelists have to pay. By showing that the overcharge is often a poor estimate of ac-
tual purchaser damages, Han, Schinkel and Tuinstra (2008) underline that accounting for
quantity effects and pass on is important to calculate the appropriate compensation.
With this paper, I add to the discussion by showing that facilitating the compensation
of actual damages can increase consumer prices, increase the expected profits of cartelists
and even decrease the expected profits of suppliers to cartelists. To derive the results, I use
a simple vertical model where downstream firms sell to consumers and need homogenous
inputs, which are offered by two upstream firms and a competitive fringe. The fringe
2This neutrality result can fail for several reasons, see Section 3.6.
3See his Theorem 3.
4ECJ, Decision of 20th September 2001, C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Crehan and Cases C-295/04 to C-
298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 13 July 2006. See Wagner (2007) for a
legal discussion. In line with this, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany (BGH) based a cartel damage
decision on the norm that those who suffered losses should be compensated accordingly (Decision of 29th
June 2011 – KZR 75/10).
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should be understood broadly as any alternative source such as the world market or
in-house production.
Though framed in terms of horizontal cartels, the present analysis applies analogously
to excessive pricing of dominant firms. The main assumption underlying the model is that
the cartelists and their trade partners rationally anticipate the compensation payments
when trading. Informally speaking, this means that there needs to be at least some
suspicion in the industry that there could be a cartel or an abuse of a dominant position
and that damage claims have a chance to succeed.
I study the effects of the LPC in case of both upstream and downstream cartels. I
begin with the case that the upstream firms form a cartel by fixing their sales prices and
that the downstream firms can claim compensation for the profits lost due to the upstream
cartel. The compensation payments are modeled as a proballistic process which can, for
example, be interpreted as follow-on lawsuits after a public detection. For the case in
which sourcing from the competitive fringe is attractive (i.e., it is relatively efficient),
I initially assume that claims are valid only if the claimants actually trade with the
cartelists. This is plausible because when trade with a cartelist has not taken place, it
appears very difficult to prove that trade would have taken place, were there no cartel.5
There are two interesting effects of LPC claims in this case.
First, consumer prices increase when downstream firms are entitled to LPC claims
against upstream cartelists. The reason is that once a downstream firm expects a positive
LPC, it is willing to purchase from the cartelists at input prices above the competitive
fringe cost. Hence the cartelists increase input prices and, in best response to that, con-
sumer prices increase as well. This result is sustained with two-part tariffs as long as
exclusivity clauses are not enforceable and there is sufficient price competition down-
stream.
Second, the expected cartel profits can increase when LPC claims are in place. The
reason is that the claims relax the constraints of the contracting problem between the
upstream cartelists and each downstream firm. Hence, the industry profits increase and
the cartelists can appropriate part of that.
Without a competitive fringe, instead, purchaser claims against an upstream cartel re-
duce consumer prices, hurt the cartelists, and benefit the downstream firms – if upstream
tariffs are linear. This is in line with common sense of how private enforcement should
work. With two-part tariffs, however, consumer prices are not affected and claimants do
not gain in expected value. This neutrality is analogous to the result of Salant (1987) and
Baker (1988) for both tariffs and compensation linear in actual quantity. This finding
indicates that the assumption of linear tariffs, made in essentially all articles on cartel
damages, is not innocuous and its consequences not yet fully investigated in this litera-
ture.6
In the second part of this paper I investigate the LPC in case of downstream cartels. In
principle, everybody can claim compensation for the damages suffered from a competition
law infringement. This includes suppliers of cartelists. Although there is not yet an
established practice for these cases in Europe, they will potentially be more relevant
5Note, however, that downstream firms sourcing from the efficient upstream firms in case of upstream
competition is the right counter-factual.
6See for instanceBaker (1988); Besanko and Spulber (1990); Boone and Müller (2011); Han et al. (2008);
Hellwig (2007); Salant (1987); Schinkel et al. (2008); Spiller (1986); Verboven and Dijk (2009).
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once private enforcement becomes more common.7 From both an academic and a policy
perspective, it is therefore interesting to study the implications of facilitating supplier
damage compensations with respect to social welfare goals. Towards this I consider the
case that downstream firms jointly fix their sales prices (cartelize). For each downstream
firm there is one efficient supplier. Suppliers compete and can claim compensation for
damages due to the cartel.
A damage occurs to suppliers when the downstream cartelists order less quantity.
Additionally, a downstream cartel tends to exert pressure on the upstream margins. The
reason is that when jointly maximizing profits, the downstream firms tend to pass on cost
increases for one product to a larger extent than it would be the case under imperfect
competition. Hence, upstream firms have more individual incentives to lower their prices
in case of a downstream cartel. The LPC accounts for these damages.
The LPC rule, however, adds another effect that is detrimental to suppliers, when
compared to the situation with a cartel and no compensation rule. Upstream firms have
to additionally lower their prices to compensate downstream cartelists for expected com-
pensation payments when trading with them, as otherwise the cartelists source from the
fringe. Yet the lower marginal input prices of the efficient upstream firms, the more at-
tractive it is for the cartelists to source only one input from the fringe, by that save one
expected damage obligation, and order more from the other upstream firm at the reduced
price. Hence the upstream firms need to lower their prices even more, which benefits the
cartelists, but hurts the suppliers. This yields a surprising finding: Entitling suppliers
of cartelists to claim damage compensations can actually decrease the expected profits
of the claimants below the level that would result were there a cartel and no private en-
forcement. In other words, it may not even be desirable for suppliers to have the right to
sue.
3.2. Related literature
This paper is most closely related to Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) who show that
the Overcharge Compensation has at worst no welfare effects. The main point which
the present paper adds to the literature is that facilitating private compensation claims
for profits lost due cartels or excessive pricing of dominant firms can have, surprisingly,
distinctively undesirable effects because more profitable supply contracts become feasible.
These effects include higher consumer prices, higher expected cartel profits and even a
decrease in the expected profits of the damaged firms, when compared to no compensation
rule.
Somewhat related is Harrington (2004, 2005) who investigates in a dynamic setting the
pricing of cartelists when these fear to raise suspicion about the cartel’s existence. Har-
rington shows that under specific conditions, higher cartel prices can result when public
fines are higher (2004) and when the but-for-price price used for calculating damages is
lower (2005). The reasoning for the first effect is that public fines can stabilize a car-
tel and thus allow for higher prices. The reasoning for the second effect is that a lower
but-for-price increases the Overcharge Compensation to be paid, i.e., the quantity sold
times the overcharge. To decrease that overcharge compensation, the cartelists may want
to increase the cartel price to decrease the quantity sold. These mechanisms are clearly
different from those analyzed in the static framework of this paper.
7See Han et al. (2008) for a discussion of US cases.
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More generally, by investigating private damage compensation claims, the present pa-
per adds to the literature on optimal private and public enforcement of competition law,
see Segal and Whinston (2006) for an overview. One focus of that literature is on the
use of private information for law enforcement. An advantage of private enforcement may
arise if private parties are better informed about infringements than the authority. Yet the
objectives of private agents to initiate lawsuits generally differ from social welfare objec-
tives. For instance, with private enforcement there can be incentives for private claimants
to delay actions that induce a cartel breakdown if additional compensation payments ex-
ceed additional losses (Spiller, 1986). In a related vein, Schinkel et al. (2008) show that
cartelists can bribe direct purchasers to not whistle-blow the cartel, to the detriment of
indirect purchasers. Another concern is that private parties can have incentives to initi-
ate socially detrimental lawsuits. McAfee et al. (2008) show that remuneration of private
agents for providing hints that help the authority to detect anti-competitive behavior may
be better than establishing private damage claims. In a similar spirit, Polinsky and Che
(1991) suggest that part of a damage payment should not be paid to the claimant, but to
the treasury. Such a decoupling can achieve both a high deterrence and avoid excessive
lawsuits. Moreover, Baker (1988) points out that the cartel profitability tends to be lower
if damage payments are payable to the treasury. The reason is that the price adjustments,
which counterbalance the implicit discounts that accrue to the cartelists’ trade partners,
disappear. I show that such a decoupling can hurt suppliers of cartelists who nevertheless
need to reduce their prices to remain attractive.
3.3. Framework
Two upstream firms U1 and U2 supply homogenous products at constant marginal
costs normalized to 0. Two symmetric downstream firms D1 and D2 can transform these
upstream products one-to-one into final products.8 Alternatively to sourcing inputs from
U1 or U2, each downstream firm can source equivalent inputs from a competitive fringe
at a marginal price c > 0.9 The game is structured as follows:
(1) Each supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, offers tariffs with unit prices wi to both downstream
firms.
(2) Each downstream firm Di, i ∈ {1, 2},
(a) observes all input prices,
(b) publicly accepts or rejects the tariff offers,
(c) sets the sale price pi,
(d) sources inputs, produces and sells to consumers demanding qi(pi, p−i) units.
(3) If there is a cartel, with probability α ∈ [0, 1) the cartelists have to pay compen-
sation.
In Section 3.4, I study the case that upstream firms cartelize and downstream firms
compete, and in Section 3.5 the reverse: upstream firms compete and downstream firms
cartelize. All firms are risk neutral. Competitive prices maximize individual profits,
whereas upstream (downstream) cartel prices maximize joint profits of U1 and U2 (D1
and D2). With this I abstract from the questions of how the cartel is stabilized – one
may assume that cartelists are sufficiently patient to play trigger strategies – and why
8Note that symmetry is not necessary for the analysis, but simplifies the exposition.
9The assumptions imply that the input is essential and correspond to a fixed proportions technology such
as Leontief.
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there is a cartel instead of implicit collusion. See Subsection 3.6.2 for a discussion on
cartel stability. It is common knowledge whether there is a cartel. This assumption is not
necessary in its strict form and relaxed in Subsection 3.6.1.
Similar to Baker (1988) and Salant (1987), the game structure reduces cartel detection
and lawsuits to an exogenous process. This is done mainly for tractability, but also appears
justifiable, as follow-on suits of public investigations play a major role for private damage
compensation. The probability α with which the cartelists have to pay compensation is
nevertheless allowed to increase in the cartel price for most of the analysis. For instance,
a higher cartel price may ease the burden of proof in a lawsuit and thus increase its
success rate. The probability α is common knowledge in the baseline model. Information
asymmetries between cartelists and claimants about α are investigated in Subsection 3.6.1.
3.4. Upstream cartel
Assume for this section that upstream firms U1 and U2 cartelize to maximize joint
profits, whereas D1 and D2 set prices non-cooperatively. I only analyze damage claims
of the direct purchasers D1 and D2. This appears to be the by far most relevant case
as indirect purchasers, in particular consumers, often lack both knowledge and damage
volume to consider lawsuits. In the first three subsections I study linear tariffs. Two part
tariffs follow in Subsection 3.4.4.
The profit of downstream firm i when sourcing at unit price wi is given by (pi − wi) qi,
yielding the first order condition for pi of
(3.4.1)
(
pi − wi
) ∂qi
∂pi
+ qi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Assume that for the relevant input costs {wi, w−i} there are unique equilibrium down-
stream prices p∗(wi, w−i) for each firm i, characterized by (3.4.1). Let p(w) ≡ p∗i (wi =
w,w−i = w) and q(w) ≡ qi(p(w), p(w)). Denote the equilibrium downstream profits
without any compensation payment by pi(wi, w−i) ≡ (p∗i − wi)qi(p∗i , p∗−i) and pi(w) ≡
pi(wi = w,w−i = w). To have a simple expression for the effect of an increase in
the upstream price level, denote pi′(w) ≡
[
∂pi(w1,w2)
∂w1 +
∂pi(w1,w2)
∂w2
]
w1=w2=w
and p′(w) ≡[
∂p∗(w1,w2)
∂w1 +
∂p∗(w1,w2)
∂w2
]
w1=w2=w
. Moreover, impose
Assumption 9. The downstream profit pi(w) decreases and the downstream price level
p(w) increases in the upstream price level w: pi′(w) < 0 and p′(w) > 0.
That profits decrease in the input price level is generally the case for downstream mo-
nopolies and highly plausible for competition, though not necessary.10 The price increase
holds under standard regularity conditions, as does
Assumption 10. If downstream products are substitutable (∂qi/∂p−i > 0), the profit
of downstream firm i increases in the input price of firm −i: ∂pi(wi, w−i)/∂w−i > 0.
Let wN denote the competitive upstream price. A downstream firm’s profit in case of
upstream competition is given by pi(wN). For instance, with Bertrand competition, the
upstream equilibrium prices equal the marginal costs of 0 and downstream profits equal
pi(0). Note that the assumption of Bertrand competition is not necessary: any competitive
price below the monopoly level yields the same qualitative results.
10Downstream profits decrease in the uniform input price w in case of downstream substitutes if demand
qi does not become less own price sensitive when the price level increases, e.g., if demand is linear.
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3.4.1. Lost profit compensation. The downstream profit lost due to an upstream
cartel is the difference between the equilibrium downstream profits earned under upstream
competition and upstream cartelization.11 The counter-factual profit of a downstream firm
in case of upstream competition, pi(wN), is assumed to be common knowledge of the firms;
the profit under the cartel is yet to be determined.
The LPC to downstream firm i when sourcing from the cartelists at a price wi is given
by
(3.4.2) LPCi ≡ max
{
0,
[
pi(wN)−
(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i)
]}
,
where pi(wN) is the counter-factual profit absent a cartel and (pi − wi) qi the actual down-
stream profit in the presence of a cartel. The LPC is paid with probability α,12 so the
expected total profit of a downstream firm is
Πi ≡
(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i) + αLPCi.(3.4.3)
Note that α = 0 is equivalent to no compensation rule, i.e. LPCi = 0 ∀ i. For LPCi > 0,
substituting from (3.4.2) yields
Πi =
[(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i)
]
(1− α) + pi(wN)α.(3.4.4)
Note that the first term consists of the operational profit scaled down by 1−α, as with a
profit tax of α. Differentiation of (3.4.4) with respect to pi yields the first order conditions
stated in (3.4.1), independent of α. Hence the translation from upstream to downstream
prices is unaffected by whether a LPC rule is in place (α > 0) or not (α = 0) and given
by p(w) for uniform upstream prices of w.
The two upstream firms fix a cartel price of w. The upstream cartel profit when both
downstream firms source all inputs from the cartelists is given by
ΠU ≡ 2w q(w)− α ∑
i∈{1,2}
LPCi = 2
{
w q(w)− α
[
pi(wN)− pi(w)
]}
.(3.4.5)
For α > 0 and a positive cartel overcharge w − wN , the expected LPC is positive and
reduces the cartel profit for all relevant w. The factual downstream profit pi(w) enters
the cartel profits positively, so the cartelists partly internalize the downstream profits.
This effect is the same as with forward integration. As downstream profits decrease in
the cartel price (Assumption 9), the marginal cartel profit
(3.4.6) ∂Π
U
∂w
= 2
{
q(w) + w q′(w)−
[
α′(w)
(
pi(wN)− pi(w)
)
− α(w) pi′(w)
]}
is lower with the compensation rule (equivalently: α > 0) than without it (α = 0). This
is the case even if the probability of a compensation payment is exogenous (α′(w) = 0)
because ∂2ΠU
∂w∂α
= pi′(w) < 0. If the probability increases in the cartel price (α′(w) > 0),
the marginal cartel profit is reduced further (see (3.4.6)). Overall, marginal cartel profits
are lower with a compensation rule in place.
No competitive fringe. A downstream firm only buys from the cartelists if its expected
profit when sourcing from the cartelists is weakly higher than when it sources from the
11One may generally ask whether comparing the equilibrium outcomes is the appropriate standard.
Though logically sound, one can argue that a reduction in lost profits of a claimant resulting from the
cartelists’ increase of the claimant’s competitors’ input costs should not reduce the claim. For a further
discussion along these lines see Hellwig (2007).
12The solution does not change if one scales the LPC by a positive factor µ, such as 3 for treble damages,
as long as αµ < 1. Using the normalization µ = 1 throughout reduces notation.
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fringe at a price of c. For c sufficiently large and under the assumption that cartel profits
are strictly concave, the FOC ∂ΠU
∂w
= 0 uniquely characterizes the optimal cartel price,
denoted by wK . If α > 0, the cartelists fix a lower price wK than if α = 0.13 As p′(w) > 0,
also consumer prices p(wK) are lower for α > 0. Analogously, expected downstream
profits, (1−α)pi(wK) +αpi(wN), are higher for α > 0 than the downstream profits pi(wK)
that result for α = 0. Hence
Proposition 3.1. Without a competitive fringe (c sufficiently large) and with linear
tariffs, when compared to no compensation rule, consumer prices and upstream cartel
profits are strictly lower, whereas expected downstream profits are strictly higher under
the LPC rule.
See Figure 3.4.1 for an illustration (please disregard the dashed vertical lines for now).
With the LPC, the cartel profit shifts down and to the left. Hence its maximizer also
shifts to the left with the LPC and the expected cartel profit decreases.
Competitive fringe. Consider now that there is an attractive competitive fringe, i.e.,
c is sufficiently small such that absent a compensation rule (α = 0) the cartelists fix the
maximal price of c. To make the problem interesting, assume that the competitive price
wN is strictly below c. For instance, with Bertrand competition, wN = 0. Let us first
focus on the case that single sourcing is necessary, either because suppliers offer exclusive
contracts or for technological reasons. Without exclusivity, qualitatively equivalent results
are obtained, see Subsection 3.4.3.
Recall the assumption that a downstream firm can only claim a LPC if it actually
sources from the cartelists. If one downstream firm sources from a cartelist at a price of
w, the expected profit of the other downstream firm from doing the same must be at least
as high as the profit of sourcing from the fringe at a price of c:
pi(w,w) + α
[
pi(wN , wN)− pi(w,w)
]
≥ pi(c, w).(3.4.7)
For α > 0 and w = c, the incentive compatibility constraint (3.4.7) reduces to pi(wN , wN) ≥
pi(c, c), which holds with strict inequality as pi′(w) < 0 by Assumption 1. Hence the
cartelists can raise w above c until (3.4.7) holds with equality. This implies an equilib-
rium cartel price wK > c and consumer prices exceeding the price level p(c) which results
without any compensation rule. Intuitively, the cartelists can demand a higher marginal
price because in expectation the buyers receive a fixed fee. This is similar to the logic
of slotting fees (Shaffer, 1991). Note that when compared to no compensation, the LPC
rule reduces consumer surplus!
Total equilibrium downstream profits equal the value of sourcing from the fringe, i.e.,
the right hand side of (3.4.7) evaluated at w = wK , i.e. pi(c, wK). If downstream products
are independent (∂qi/∂p−i = 0), this profit equals the profit without an LPC. With
substitutes (∂qi/∂p−i > 0), this profit is strictly higher, so competing downstream firms
benefit from the LPC rule.
What happens to cartel profits? Without the LPC, the cartel price equals c. The
first order effect of introducing an LPC is a decrease in the expected cartel profits in
(3.4.5). Yet, cartelists can charge a price above c once the LPC is in place. Indeed, in
expectation the LPC works like an upfront payment that the upstream cartelists pay to
13The implicit function theorem yields dw/dα = − ∂2ΠU∂w∂α/ ∂
2ΠU
∂w∂w . By assumption,
∂2ΠU
∂w∂w < 0 and
∂2ΠU
∂w∂α =
pi′(w) < 0.
3.4. UPSTREAM CARTEL 60
Figure 3.4.1. Upstream cartel profits. With a Lost Profit Compensation
(LPC) of downstream firms, (marginal) cartel profits are lower, but the
fringe constraint is relaxed.
downstream firms. In return, the cartelists can implement higher unit prices w which
affect downstream prices and, in turn, industry profits.
Although expected downstream profits are never lower with the LPC than without it,
upstream firms can nevertheless benefit in expectation through an increase in industry
profits. For this to occur, there must be downstream competition and a relatively efficient
fringe, so that without the LPC downstream prices are below the industry profit maxi-
mizing level. Using a linear demand specification, one can show that expected upstream
cartel profits can indeed increase once downstream competition is sufficiently strong.14
Proposition 3.2. Let the upstream cartel charge linear tariffs and c be sufficiently
small. Compared to no compensation rule, with the LPC rule both input and consumer
prices are strictly higher; downstream profits are higher for downstream substitutes, and
unchanged for independent products; expected cartel profits can be higher.
See again Figure 3.4.1 for an illustration. With the LPC, a higher cartel price is
feasible as the fringe constraint shifts to the right. Although the profit function with the
LPC is lower, the maximal expected cartel profits can thus be higher with the LPC than
without it. This possibility is illustrated by point b being above point a.
Let us briefly summarize the findings. For the case that the upstream firms can
monopolize the input market (c large), Proposition 3.1 states that the LPC rule decreases
cartel prices, decreases expected cartel profits and benefits the downstream firms as well as
consumers. This is in line with what common sense tells us. Instead, when the upstream
cartel does not monopolize the input market, Proposition 3.2 states that essentially the
opposite can happen: Cartel and consumer prices increase, expected cartel profits can
14Using the specification qi = 0.5− (β + γ) pi + γ p−i, β, γ > 0, for parameter values β = 1, α = 0.1, c =
0.05, the cartelists are in expectation better off once γ exceeds approximately 1.9, i.e., downstream
substitutability is sufficiently high.
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increase and downstream firms may not benefit from the LPC rule. The reason is that
the LPC works like a slotting fee: because in expectation the downstream firms receive a
compensation payment, they are still willing to buy from the cartelists at an input price
which is above the competitive fringe price of c.
3.4.2. Overcharge compensation. With the Overcharge Compensation (OCC), a
downstream firm is only compensated for the overcharge on each unit bought. Formally,
the OCC of downstream firm i is given by
(3.4.8) OCCi ≡ (w − wN) qi(pi, p−i),
with w denoting the uniform upstream cartel price and wN the counter-factual competitive
price, with wN ≤ w.15
Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) have shown that the OCC is neutral if there is no
competitive fringe (c large). In case of the LPC, however, we have seen that the results
crucially depend on whether there is a competitive fringe (c small vs. large). Let us
therefore briefly study the OCC for both cases, so that we can compare it with the LPC.
Using (3.4.8), the total expected profit of a downstream firm in case of the OCC reduces
to
Πi = (pi − w (1− α)) qi(pi, p−i).
Given w, the (expected) marginal costs of a downstream firm decrease as α increases.
The FOC of downstream profits with respect to pi is
(3.4.9) qi + (pi − w (1− α)) ∂qi
∂pi
= 0.
The upstream cartelists anticipate the effect of w on p when maximizing the joint expected
profits
(3.4.10)
∑
i
[w qi − αOCCi] = w (1− α)
∑
i
qi
with respect to w. Denote the effective input price by wˆ ≡ w · (1 − α) and substitute
it in (3.4.9) and (3.4.10) to observe that the expressions reduce to the ones without any
compensation rule (obtained by setting α = 0), only now with wˆ instead of w.
No competitive fringe. Without an attractive competitive fringe (i.e. with c sufficiently
large), the effective input price that maximizes cartel profits is again given by wˆ = wM ≡
arg maxw w · q(w). The resulting consumer prices are given by p(wM) and equal the
equilibrium prices absent any compensation rule.16 Hence the expected upstream and
downstream profits, as well as consumer surplus, are the same under the OCC and no
compensation rule.
This neutrality result holds also if α increases in w. An increased probability of a
compensation payment lowers the expected input price of a purchaser and raises the
15In principle, nothing changes when scaling the OCC by a factor such as 3 for triple damages; see
footnote 16 for details.
16The optimal “nominal” cartel price wOCC is obtained by solving wOCC = wM/(1 − α(wOCC)). The
condition has a solution if maxw wˆ(w) ≥ wM , i.e., if it is possible to raise the effective input price to
the monopoly level. This is clearly the case if α(w) < 1∀w ≥ 0. If α(w) reaches 1 before the previous
condition holds, the optimal cartel price is lower and given by arg maxw wˆ(w) (cf. Salant, 1987). This
can in particular be the case if α is not just a probability, but includes a damage multiplier above 1, see
footnote 12.
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cartelists’ expected compensation obligations, but this change is perfectly compensated
through an increase in the nominal cartel price.
Competitive fringe. Let us now consider the case that there is an attractive competitive
fringe (c sufficiently small). A downstream firm will simply source all inputs where the
expected costs are lowest. With no compensation when sourcing from the fringe, the
effective cartel price is lower than the alternative sourcing costs if w (1−α(w)) ≤ c. Thus
the cartelists will raise w until this condition holds with equality. In turn, the optimal
nominal cartel price wOCC is above c, but the effective marginal input costs of downstream
firms equal c and consumer prices equal p(c) as without any compensation rule. Hence
the neutrality of the OCC is sustained.
Proposition 3.3. Let the upstream cartel charge linear tariffs. With the OCC rule,
both expected input and consumer prices as well as expected up- and downstream profits
are as with no compensation rule, i.e., the OCC is neutral, independent of the magnitude
of c.
Whereas the LPC has adverse effects when there is an attractive competitive fringe
(c small), but beneficial effects otherwise (c large), the OCC is just neutral in both cases.
This finding is interesting because the only difference is in how the damage compensation
is calculated: the OCC accounts for the cartel overcharge on each unit bought, whereas
the LPC accounts also for losses from foregone sales and pass on.
Towards an intuition, recall that with linear tariffs, up- and downstream firms can
write contracts that perfectly counterbalance the OCC as it is linear in quantity. This
results in neutrality. Instead, the LPC introduces a non-linearity similar to a slotting fee,
which effectively changes the linear to particular non-linear tariffs. Allowing for two-part
tariffs indeed neutralizes the effects of the LPC when the cartel monopolizes the input
market. Interestingly, we will see in Subsection 3.4.4 that the adverse effects of the LPC
persist with two-part tariffs if the competitive fringe is relatively efficient and contracts
are non-exclusive.
3.4.3. Non-exclusive linear upstream tariffs. In Subsection 3.4.1 I assumed sup-
ply contracts to be exclusive: a buyer had to source all inputs from one supplier. In this
subsection I show that Proposition 3.2 on the LPC also holds for non-exclusive linear con-
tracts, with non-exclusive meaning that downstream firms are not restricted in sourcing
(additional) inputs from the competitive fringe.
As before, I assume that there is no LPC when sourcing from the fringe (this assump-
tion is relaxed in Subsection 3.4.5). This implies that a downstream firm which sources
some inputs alternatively is not compensated for these expenses, although they are above
the counter-factual expenses which would result with no upstream cartel. Consequently,
the LPC is computed as if the inputs actually sourced from the fringe would have also been
sourced from the fringe were there no cartel. Thus the counter-factual downstream profits
equal pi(wN)− c (1− β) qi, where (1− β) denotes the fraction of inputs actually sourced
from the fringe, and consequently β the fraction actually sourced from the cartelists.
The actual operational profit of a downstream firm is
(3.4.11) pii ≡ [pi − β w − (1− β) c] qi.
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A downstream firm’s expected profit for a positive LPC is17
Πi = pii + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi − pii
]
= (1− α) pii + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi
]
= (1− α) [pi − β w − (1− β) c] qi + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi
]
= (1− α)
[
pi − β w − (1− β) c 11− α
]
qi + αpi(wN).
As can be easily seen when differentiating the last line with respect to β and setting w = c,
downstream profits increase in the fraction β of inputs sourced from the cartelists at equal
prices as this lowers expected damages. The cartelists can thus raise w up to c/(1 − α)
without losing sales to the fringe. The cartelists also have to ensure that a downstream
firm does not deviate to source all inputs from the fringe and earn a deviation profit
of pi(c, w), as with exclusive tariffs.18 Independent of which constraint is stricter, for
c sufficiently small, the optimal cartel price is above c, yielding consumer prices above
p(c) also with non-exclusive contracts. As a downstream firm can assure itself a profit of
pi(c, wK) by sourcing all inputs from the fringe, it is better off under the LPC if downstream
products are substitutes and not worse off otherwise, similar to the case with exclusive
contracts in Subsection 3.4.1.
3.4.4. Two-part tariffs. Assume now that the suppliers U1 and U2 offer to each
downstream firm a two-part tariff with a marginal price w as before and additionally
a fixed fee F that needs to be paid upon acceptance of the contract. Maintain the as-
sumption entertained so far that sourcing from the fringe yields no compensation claim.19
When both downstream firms source inputs from the cartelists, each earns an expected
profit of
(3.4.12) Πi(w,F ) = pi(w,w)− F + α [piN − (pi(w,w)− F )] ,
with piN denoting the counter-factual downstream profit without an upstream cartel.20
If Di accepts a (non-exclusive) contract and sources one more unit of input from the
fringe instead of from a cartelist, it has a direct cost saving of w − c, but its expected
compensation is reduced by αw due to the assumption of no compensation for sourcing
from the fringe. This is the same logic as with linear tariffs in Subsection 3.4.3. Hence
the downstream firm optimally sources all inputs from the cartelists if w ≤ c /(1 − α).
17The argument w of α is dropped here for brevity. The results do not depend on whether α′ is zero or
positive as long as α > 0.
18Intuitively, if a marginal deviation is not profitable, a discrete deviation, which additionally implies a
discrete decrease of the non-linear compensation component, is not profitable either. This logic should
be valid at least under strategic complementarity in downstream prices because then not accepting the
supply contract of the cartelists and thereby committing to a lower perceived marginal input cost of c
should be detrimental. For strategic substitutes, this may though favor the discrete deviation.
19The relaxation of this assumption is discussed for linear tariffs in Subsection 3.4.5. A similar logic
applies for two-part tariffs.
20I do not use the notation pi(wN ) as the competitive upstream tariffs are potentially also non-linear and
downstream profits may thus differ.
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The cartelists’ problem is to
max
F,w
ΠU = 2 [w q(w) + F ]− α∑
i
LPCi(3.4.13)
s.t. Πi(w,F ) ≥ pi(c, w)∀i,(3.4.14)
w ≤ c/(1− α).(3.4.15)
The participation constraints in (3.4.14) clearly have to hold with equality as otherwise
the cartelists could profitably raise F . The no arbitrage condition (3.4.15) is relevant in
case contracts do not contain exclusivity clauses such that for w > c /(1− α) and F < 0,
purchasers could profitably cash F , but actually source from the fringe.
Substituting for Πi from (3.4.12) in (3.4.14), imposing equality and solving for F yields
pi(c, w) = pi(w,w)− F + α [piN − (pi(w,w)− F )]
=⇒ F = pi(w,w) + αpiN − pi(c, w)(1− α) .(3.4.16)
Substituting in (3.4.13) for LPCi from the brackets in (3.4.12) and for F from (3.4.16)
yields
ΠU = 2 [p(w) q(w)− pi(c, w)] ,(3.4.17)
which is independent of α. If contracts are exclusive, the no-arbitrage condition (3.4.15)
is irrelevant and the problem is thus independent of α. Hence for any c, the LPC has no
effect on expected cartel profits and marginal equilibrium prices wK and pK .
Instead, if contracts are non-exclusive, the no-arbitrage condition (3.4.15) is relevant
and downstream firms prefer to source from the fringe once w > c /(1 − α). Evaluating
∂ΠU/∂w at w = c yields that it is positive for sufficiently small c and downstream substi-
tutes.21 For α = 0, the optimal tariff is thus {FK = 0, wK = c} and endogenously linear.
For α > 0, the no-arbitrage constraint is relaxed and a marginal price w > c is feasible
and also profitable for the cartelists if ∂ΠU/∂w > 0 at w = c. Hence without exclusivity
clauses, but with downstream price competition and sufficiently small c, marginal prices
as well as cartel profits are above the levels which would result without am LPC. The
equilibrium downstream profit equals the outside option value pi(c, wK) on the right hand
side of (3.4.14) and is higher under the LPC as ∂pi(c, w)/∂w > 0.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that an upstream cartel uses two-part tariffs. Compared
to no LPC rule,
(i) if there is no competitive fringe or downstream products are not substitutable or
input contracts are exclusive, the LPC is neutral with respect to marginal prices and
expected profits.
(ii) If sourcing from the fringe is sufficiently attractive and input contracts are not
exclusive and downstream products are substitutes, marginal prices and both expected up-
stream cartel and downstream profits increase.
The first part of Proposition 3.4 nicely relates the neutrality of the OCC with linear
tariffs (Proposition 3.3): The OCC only imposes a discount that is linear in quantity.
Hence linear tariffs are sufficient to neutralize this discount. Instead, the LPC implies
21See Proposition 4 in Hunold et al. (2012a). That ∂ΠU/∂w > 0 at w = c depends on the assumption of
downstream price competition.
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a non-linear discount which essentially transforms the linear upstream tariffs into two-
part tariffs. This yielded Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. With two-part tariffs, the non-linear
discount implied by the LPC can be contracted around again, yielding Proposition 3.4
(i).
Yet, even with two-part tariffs the cartelists are constrained by the competitive fringe
in their marginal price setting as the downstream firms’ outside options are endogenous
(see (3.4.17)). In cases where the cartelists want to set the highest feasible marginal price,
the LPC helps them to sustain even higher prices. This is the same result as before with
linear tariffs in Subsection 3.4.3 and yields Proposition 3.4 (ii).
3.4.5. Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe. Up to here,
a firm was assumed to receive compensation with positive probability only if it actually
traded with the cartelists. Note that compared to the regime with competitive upstream
prices, a damage for a buyer also arises if the upstream cartel prices are so high that it
is best for him to source from the less efficient competitive fringe. Although it appears
difficult to successfully claim cartel damages without having traded with a cartelist, it is
interesting to study the effects of relaxing this assumption. As we will see, the effectiveness
of the compensation rule in reducing consumer prices and decreasing cartel profits is
increased in this case. Facilitating such claims, if possible, is thus a desirable policy
consideration.
Assume that a downstream firm can also claim a LPC if it does not source from the
upstream cartelists. Clearly, relaxing the assumption on alternative compensation is only
interesting if the competitive fringe is relevant (c sufficiently small), as otherwise sourcing
alternatively is not a consideration.
When the linear contracts are exclusive,22 downstream firm Di prefers to source from
the cartelists, given the other firm does so, over sourcing from the fringe if23
pi(w,w) + α(w)LPCi ≥ pi(c, w) + α(w)LPCi.(3.4.18)
Condition (3.4.18) reduces to
(3.4.19) pi(w,w) ≥ pi(c, w),
if LPCi on the right hand side of (3.4.18) is either conditioned on w or the actual al-
ternative input price of c.24 Raising w above c violates (3.4.19): each downstream firm
then prefers to source from the fringe, so the equilibrium cartel price is wK = c. In turn,
downstream prices equal p(c) as without a compensation rule.
As input prices do not counterbalance the LPC, the LPC rule clearly implies a redis-
tribution from upstream cartelists to downstream firms, yielding
Proposition 3.5. Assume that an upstream cartel charges linear tariffs, there is an
attractive competitive fringe (c sufficiently small), and sourcing from the fringe yields
the same LPC as sourcing from the cartelists. When compared to no compensation rule,
input and consumer prices are unchanged, whereas expected downstream profits increase
and cartel profits decrease.
22The same results can easily be obtained for non-exclusive contracts.
23The assumption implicit in this statement is that the compensation probability α depends on the cartel
price w independently of whether one or both firms actually source from the cartel.
24The reduction is straightforward if LPCi is equal on both sides of (3.4.18). Explicitly conditioning
on actual input prices yields pi(w,w) + α(w) [pi(0) − pi(w,w)] ≥ pi(c, w) + α(w) [pi(0) − pi(c, w)] which
equivalently reduces to (3.4.19).
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Excursion: Overcharge Compensation. If a downstream firm receives the OCC also if
it sources from the fringe, it buys from an upstream cartelist only if
w − α(w)w ≤ c− α(w)w.
This implies w ≤ c, yielding an optimal nominal cartel price of wK = c.25 Interestingly,
the effective marginal costs of downstream firms now equal c (1 − α(c)) and are strictly
below c for α > 0. Hence granting an OCC to downstream firms also when sourcing from
the fringe yields lower consumer prices and decreases the upstream cartel profitability
compared to no compensation rule.
3.5. Downstream cartel
Assume now that the downstream firms D1 and D2 fix sales prices to maximize joint
profits. To make this meaningful, assume that the downstream products are substitutes:
∂qi/∂p−i > 0, so downstream firms benefit from a cartel which allows them to internalize
the price externalities. Moreover, assume that demand decreases when all prices increase:
∂qi/∂pi + ∂qi/∂p−i < 0. Maintain the assumption that each supplier can make take-it-or-
leave-it offers in the first stage, so the downstream cartelists can still not directly influence
input prices.
Upstream firms U1 and U2 set prices non-cooperatively and are eligible to claim
compensation from the downstream cartelists, but no claims accrue to the competitive
fringe.26 To study the effects of a downstream cartel on supplier profits, it is necessary
that U1 and U2 can make positive profits. Assume for simplicity that supplier U1 (U2)
can serve D1 (D2) at zero marginal costs as before, but that serving the other downstream
firm is prohibitively costly.
The joint downstream profits when sourcing all input from U1 and U2 at w1 and w2
are given by
ΠD(pi, p−i) ≡
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi
)
qi(pi, p−i)− αLPCi
}
.
Let piN denote the equilibrium profit of a supplier when both up- and downstream prices
are set non-cooperatively. The LPC claim of supplier Ui if selling to Di is
LPCi = max
[
0, piN − wi qi(pi, p−i)
]
.
For LPCi > 0, downstream profits are
ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi(pi, p−i)− αpiN
}
.(3.5.1)
The profit of supplier Ui is
(3.5.2) Πi = (1− α)wi qi + αpiN .
25Note that also if the purchaser is compensated with c instead of wK when sourcing from the fringe, the
same results obtain.
26For example, because the fringe firms make zero profits or because the downstream firm’s alternative
is to produce in-house.
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No competitive fringe. Without a competitive fringe (c sufficiently large), each supplier
is the monopolist of its downstream firm. The suppliers still influence each other indirectly
through the effects of input prices on sales prices and thus input sales.
For now assume that the probability of a due payment is completely exogenous, i.e., α
does not depend on the cartel prices.27 Let w˜i ≡ wi (1− α) and substitute in (3.5.1) and
(3.5.2) to observe that given w˜i, the marginal profits with respect to the corresponding
prices do not depend on α. Hence the effective equilibrium upstream price, denoted
by w˜∗, is not a function of α, whereas the nominal price solves w∗ = w˜∗/ (1− α (w∗)).
The equilibrium downstream cartel price, denoted by pK , is not affected by the LPC. A
supplier’s expected profit,
Πi = w˜∗qi(pK , pK) + αpiN ,
increases in α by the second term. As pK is invariant in α, downstream cartel profits
must decrease in α.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that there is a downstream cartel, supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2},
is a monopolist for firm Di using linear tariffs (c sufficiently large), and α is exogenous.
Compared to no compensation rule, the LPC has no effect on consumer prices, benefits
suppliers and decreases cartel profits.
Competitive fringe. Assume now that the fringe price c is sufficiently small such that
absent any compensation rule, it is optimal for each supplier to charge c both in case of a
downstream cartel and downstream competition.28 At equal input prices, the downstream
cartel markup is above the competitive markup. Hence the quantity sold is lower with a
cartel and upstream profits are smaller.
With the LPC, the cartelists’ choice between buying inputs for Di from the efficient
supplier Ui and sourcing from the fringe depends not simply on whether input price wi
is below or above c, but also on the expected damage payments.
Recall the assumption that a LPC claim is valid only if trade with the cartelists takes
place. If wi = c and LPCi > 0, the cartelists prefer sourcing from the fringe as they pay
the same input price and avoid the damage payment. Hence the upstream firms have to
lower their prices below c to remain attractive.29
For LPCi > 0, the cartel profit from sourcing all inputs from U1 and U2 at uniform
prices of w1 = w2 = w is defined by (3.5.1). The cartel profit from sourcing input for D1
from the fringe and input for D2 from U2 at w is
(3.5.3) ΠALTD (p1, p2|w) ≡ (p1 − c) q1(p1, p2) + (p2 − w (1− α)) q2(p2, p1) − αpiN .
The value of sourcing from U1 depends on the input price for product U2. In equilibrium,
it must be that
27This simplifies the exposition as otherwise one needs to explain how upstream firms account for how
their input prices affect downstream cartel margins and in turn the detection probability. That distracts
from the main point.
28This assumption is not completely innocuous. Intuitively, a downstream cartel puts additional pres-
sure on input prices. In particular, with homogenous downstream products the equilibrium upstream
prices equal 0 in case of joint downstream profit maximization because it does not matter which pro-
ducer’s product is sold more, except for the input price. Instead, upstream prices are positive in case of
downstream competition a la Cournot.
29Note that this logic also applies if the LPC is not payable to the suppliers, but instead to the competition
authority. This decoupling has been suggested by Polinsky and Che (1991) to avoid excessive lawsuits
(recall the discussion in the Introduction).
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(3.5.4) max
p1,p2
ΠD(p1, p2|w1 = w2 = w) = max
p1,p2
ΠALTD (p1, p2|w2 = w),
i.e., for any price larger w charged by supplier Ui, the cartelists prefer to source the inputs
for Di from the fringe at price c and adjust sales prices accordingly.
Recall that without compensation and c sufficiently small, the equilibrium input prices
equal c. Hence there is no gain for the downstream cartelists from adjusting sales prices
when turning to the competitive fringe for one product. Instead, with the LPC and input
prices below c, the cartelists can profitably adjust prices:30 When deviating to source
inputs for D1 alternatively at price c, while continuing to source inputs for D2 at a price
w < c, the downstream cartelists under standard conditions (as with linear demand)
optimally raise the sales price on the high cost product of D1 and thus make a higher
profit on the low cost product of D2. Hence the attractiveness of the cartelists’ outside
option is higher once w < c. Intuitively, the more substitutable the downstream products
are, the more attractive this option becomes.
This logic yields a striking possibility: With the LPC in place, the expected profit of
a supplier may be lower than that earned without a compensation rule. This intuition
can be confirmed using the linear demand specification qi = 1/2− (β + γ) pi + γ p−i. For
large parameter ranges with a sufficiently high substitution intensity γ, the optimal input
prices without a compensation rule equal c and suppliers are worse off under the LPC,
whereas cartelists are better off. See Table 1 for the parametric results.
γ Upstream price (w) ΠU1(α = 1/2)/ΠU1(α = 0) ΠD(α = 1/2)/ΠD(α = 0)
0.5 0.04 104% 100%
1.65 0.02 100% 101%
4 0 83% 105%
5 −0.02 69% 108%
Table 1. Results for α = 0.5, β = 1, c = 0.05 and increasing degrees of
downstream competition (γ). Column 3 presents the supplier profit with the
LPC relative to no LPC, Column 4 the ratio of downstream cartel profits.
Proposition 3.7. Assume that there is a downstream cartel, each supplier Ui, i ∈
{1, 2}, can only supply downstream firm Di using linear tariffs, and the competitive fringe
is attractive (c sufficiently small). Compared to no compensation rule, the LPC decreases
consumer prices, but may increase cartel profits and hurt suppliers.
Intuitively, with two-part tariffs a supplier can make its offer more attractive by low-
ering the fixed fee and at the same time still offer optimal marginal price. In consequence,
the rent shift between supplier and customer that is imposed by the LPC is simply coun-
teracted through the fixed fees and the LPC is neutral.
Proposition 3.8. Assume that there is a downstream cartel and each supplier Ui, i ∈
{1, 2}, can only supply downstream firm Di; two-part tariffs are feasible. If there is
no competitive fringe or it yields no LPC and α is exogenous, the LPC does not affect
consumer prices and expected profits, when compared to no compensation rule.
Proof. See Appendix. 
30Even at prices of c and the LPC in place, in case of a deviation a price adjustment is profitable as the
effective input price when sourcing from a supplier Ui is c (1− α) instead of c.
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3.5.1. Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe. Assume
again that upstream tariffs are linear and, furthermore, that supplier Ui is compensated
with
max
[
0,
(
piN − β wi qi
)]
,
where β denotes the fraction of inputs for Di which the cartelists purchase from Ui,
and 1− β the fraction of inputs for Di which the cartelists purchase from the fringe. In
case of a positive expected compensation (assumed henceforth), sourcing one unit from the
fringe decreases cartel profits by c, whereas sourcing one unit from Ui decreases (expected)
profits by wi−αwi. The downstream cartelists are indifferent at wi = c/(1−α), so supplier
Ui can raise price above c, yielding equilibrium upstream prices of w∗ = c/(1−α) > c for
c sufficiently small. The expected supplier profit equals
w∗qi + α
[
piN − w∗qi
]
= c qi + αpiN .
For the cartelists, the effective input prices equal c as without any compensation rule.
Downstream cartelists are worse off compared to no compensation rule because they
additionally pay αpiN in expectation to the suppliers.
If α is independent of the cartel prices, i.e. α′(w) = 0, the resulting downstream prices
and quantities are as with no compensation rule. If α increases in the cartel markup, i.e.
α′(w) > 0, marginal cartel profits are lower, cartel prices lower and quantities higher.31
This benefits both consumers and suppliers. As analyzed in Subsection 3.4.5 for upstream
cartels, compensating for cartel damages even if no trade with the cartelists has taken
place is beneficial for consumers.
Proposition 3.9. Assume that there is a downstream cartel and each supplier Ui, i ∈
{1, 2}, can only supply downstream firm Di using linear tariffs. If there is an attractive
competitive fringe (c sufficiently small) and sourcing from also yields the LPC, the LPC
benefits suppliers and hurts the cartelists. Consumer prices decrease only if α increases
in the cartel mark-up and are unchanged otherwise.
3.6. Extensions
3.6.1. Asymmetric information about the probability of compensation. So
far I have assumed that all firms know the detection probability α and are aware of its
public nature. This simplifies the exposition, but is not necessarily realistic. The opposite
extreme case considered by Block et al. (1981) is that purchasers of upstream cartelists
are agnostic about the possibility of a damage compensation, i.e., assess α with zero, and
cartelists are aware of this. Block et al. have shown that this can be beneficial for the
purchasers who than – incorrectly – take the nominal input price to be the effective one.
Hence, the cartelists cannot increase prices to neutralize the rebate, and in turn the cartel
profitability decreases also with the overcharge compensation, whereas purchasers benefit.
Besanko and Spulber (1990) have shown that the full neutrality of the overcharge
compensation derived by Baker (1988) and Salant (1987) can fail if the cartelists’ costs
are private knowledge: the purchasers are no more sure about the effective input, i.e.
whether it is due to high cost or a cartel overcharge. In turn cartelists have incentives to
moderate the price.
31Note that the marginal profit of ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi
)
qi − αmax
[
0,
(
piN − β wi qi
)]}
with
respect to pi is lower if ∂α/∂pi > 0 and the supplier has a loss due to the cartel.
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Yet, the major results presented in the present paper can be obtained also in case
of asymmetric information. To illustrate this, let us consider a simple example: The
cartelists know the true probability α of a compensation payment when there is a cartel,
whereas customers do not know whether collusion is implicit (read: legal, no compen-
sation claims) or explicit (a cartel, compensation claims). Suppose that it is common
knowledge that collusion is explicit with probability γ > 0. The customers thus expect a
compensation payment with probability αγ. Suppose further that the suppliers U1 and
U2 collude and there is an attractive competitive fringe (c sufficiently small), but there
is no compensation in case of alternative sourcing. If both U1 and U2 charge a (linear)
input price of c, the customers strictly prefer to source from U1 or U2 over sourcing from
the fringe: Only if they source from U1 or U2, they receive compensations with a positive
probability. Hence, the (linear) equilibrium price charged by the colluding suppliers is
above w, both in case of explicit and implicit collusion. Similarly, also the other adverse
effects stated in Subsection 3.4.1 hold for γ sufficiently large. Note that the compensa-
tion rule consequently also has adverse effects in case that collusion is indeed implicit.
The implicit colluders thus benefit from the umbrella of private enforcement of the cartel
prohibition.
Overall, it appears plausible that the trade partners of cartelists have at least some
knowledge (say, suspicion) of collusive behavior, and that the cartelists are aware of this.
Moreover, recall that the results of this paper also apply for a dominant firm that charges
excessive prices. For dominant firms it appears even more likely that their trade partners
are aware of excessive pricing, though there may be common uncertainty about whether
this can be proved in court (which is captured by α).
3.6.2. Cartel stability. Private enforcement may cause substantial damage obliga-
tions to accumulate over time. Eventually, the motive of avoiding discovery of evidence
and by that avoiding paying the damage obligations may thus become the dominating
objective of the cartelists. If the continuation of the cartel yields the highest discovery
probability, there are thus incentives for a cartel breakdown. A cartel breakdown may,
however, facilitate cartel detection because it causes price jumps which are suspicious for
trade partners or the competition authorities. In this case private enforcement can even
stabilize the cartel as defection from a cartel may become highly unprofitable. Yet, this
logic also applies to public fines, see Harrington (2004).32
A further investigation of cartel stability in the context of private enforcement is out
of the scope of this paper, but appears worthwhile for future research.
3.6.3. Endogenous detection. Recall that α denotes the probability of a damage
compensation. This probability may increase in the cartel price for several reasons. For
example, providing convincing evidence of a damage due a cartel may be easier when the
markup is higher, so that lawsuits tend to be more successful and more frequent than in
case of low markups.
Moreover, the detection probability may increase with the cartel price. In a dynamic
setting, an increase in the cartel price today thus reduces expected future cartel profits.
Purchasers of the cartelists may though not perceive that as a discount on their sales
32Straightforward is the argument that private damage compensation claims can reduce the incentives for
leniency applications, in particular if the applicant’s information is disclosed to private parties, making
it an easy target.
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of today. Whinston (2006) shows that the neutrality result of Baker (1988) and Salant
(1987) for the case of OCC and monopolistic suppliers fails in this case.
The alleviating effect of an increase in the detection probability generally also applies
for the LPC studied in this paper, but the results are more robust than in the OCC case for
at least two reasons. First, the LPC is not just neutral, but the LPC can strictly decrease
allocative efficiency, benefit both upstream and downstream cartelists and hurt suppliers.
Hence, endogenizing the detection probability in a dynamic setting may weaken, but does
not necessarily overturn the result of strictly adverse effects. The second reason is slightly
more technical: The aforementioned results (in particular Propositions 2 and 4) occur
in case alternative sourcing is attractive. This involves corner solutions in the pricing
problems which persist when the marginal profits are slightly perturbed.
3.7. Conclusion
By establishing private damage compensation claims, the EU-Commission aims at
increasing the effectiveness of cartel deterrence, improving corrective justice by compen-
sating those who suffered losses, and increasing efficiency. I show that compensating actual
losses (i.e., the Lost Profit Compensation) by means of private lawsuits can counteract
the pursuit of the Commission’s goals: Private damage claims can increase cartel profits
as well as consumer prices, and hurt suppliers of cartelists when entitled to compensa-
tion claims. The mechanism at work is that if anticipated, the expected compensation
payments from the cartelists to their trade partners are counterbalanced through prices
that are more favorable to the cartelists. The same logic applies to excessive pricing of
dominant firms.
Forcing infringers to pay claimants the profit lost due to the infringement is the ex-
post measure that achieves full compensation. Indeed, European courts have stated that
compensating lost profits is the norm and also the EU-Commission has indicated to aim
at full compensation. Moreover, Han et al. (2008) have shown by means of an oligopoly
model that the Overcharge Compensation can be far away from actual losses due to a
cartel. This favors the Lost Profit Compensation, although it is harder to compute than
the Overcharge Compensation.
Investigating ex-ante incentives, I show in this paper that Lost Profit Compensation
claims of customers can have completely undesirable allocative effects. These effects arise
if there is fringe competition upstream in spite of the cartel, e.g., due to imports or in-
house production. If the cartel monopolizes the input market, instead, the Lost Profit
Compensation tends to provide socially desirable incentives and tends to perform better
than the Overcharge Compensation. The latter has already been studied by Baker (1988)
and Salant (1987) in a less general framework and has been confirmed to be at worst
neutral in terms of expected profits and consumer prices. As a policy implication, the
Overcharge Compensation is likely to be more desirable than the Lost Profit Compensa-
tion in terms of ex-ante incentives if cartels and dominant firms are expected to be unable
to fully monopolize the market in most cases.
In the US, suppliers have been recognized as antitrust victims in some, but were denied
standing in other cases (Han et al., 2008). The legal treatment in the EU is still open. I
have pointed out that facilitating supplier claims can also have undesirable effects. Most
strikingly, in some cases it does not hurt, and in others it even benefits suppliers to not
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have standing. In other words: Facilitating supplier damage claims may be intended to
benefit suppliers, but it may turn out to be a curse for them.
The arguments provided in this paper can be used to structure and stimulate the policy
discussion about ex-ante incentives of private compensation claims in case of competition
law infringements, in particular cartels and abuses of dominant positions. One should,
however, bear in mind that the adverse results are derived under two central assumptions.
The first is that damages can only be claimed if trade with the cartelists took place, so
that sourcing from the competitive fringe does not trigger compensation. This appears
to be realistic. Even if legally possible, it is highly likely that it is effectively much
harder or even infeasible to claim a commercial damage if one did not actually trade
with the cartelists. The second assumption is that the cartelists and their trade partners
rationally anticipate the compensation payments when trading. Informally speaking, this
means that there needs to be at least some suspicion in the industry that there could
be a cartel or an abuse of a dominant position and that damage claims have a chance
to succeed. This also appears plausible, and at the same time an interesting avenue for
empirical research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.9. Let piN denote a supplier’s profit in case of down-
stream competition. When sourcing from supplier Ui, the downstream cartelists face a
damage claim of LPCi = max
{
0, piN − [wi qi(pi, p−i) + F i]
}
. For LPCi > 0, the profit
of supplier Ui is
(3.7.1) Πi =
(
wi qi + F i
)
(1− α) + αpiN .
Downstream cartel profits when sourcing from U1 and U2 become
ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi − F i (1− α)− αpiN
}
.(3.7.2)
The cartelists’ profit when sourcing from Ui for Di and from the fringe for D − i is
ΠALTD (pi, p−i) =
(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi − F i (1− α)− αpiN + (p−i − c) q−i.
The cartelists are indifferent between the latter and sourcing both from U1 and U2 if
max
p1,p2
ΠALTD (p1, p2) = maxp1,p2 ΠD(p1, p2).(3.7.3)
To simplify this exposition, assume that α is exogenous. Let {p∗i , p∗−i} = maxp1,p2ΠD to
reduce (3.7.3) to
F i (1− α) = (p∗i−wi (1 + α)) qi+(p∗−i−w−i (1 + α)) q−i−F−i (1− α)−2αpiN−maxp1,p2 Π
ALT
D .
Substituting F i in (3.7.1) yields
(3.7.4) Πi = p∗i qi + (p∗−i − w−i (1 + α)) q−i − F−i (1− α)− αpiN −maxp1,p2 Π
ALT
D .
The profit is maximized when the downstream cartelists face the true input costs. Observe
in (3.7.4) that for w−i = 0, it is profit maximizing to set wi = 0. Hence marginal upstream
prices of 0 are mutually best responses, independent of the value of α. Under symmetric
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upstream tariffs with w1 = w2 = 0, the indifference condition (3.7.3) reduces to
F (1− α) = max
p1,p2
∑
i∈{1,2}
{pi qi} −max
p1,p2
{pi qi + (p−i − c) q−i} − αpiN
and
(3.7.5) Πi = max
p1,p2
∑
i∈{1,2}
{pi qi} −max
p1,p2
{pi qi + (p−i − c) q−i} ,
which is independent of α. Hence the LPC is neutral in terms of consumer prices and
expected profits. 
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